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I. Introduction
In the postmodern world nothing can be known for certain, including that
assertion. Although postmodernism is hardly universally accepted, its influence
upon popular culture is considerable and growing. There is no reason to think
that the American judiciary, or the Justices of the United States Supreme Court
in particular, are exempt from the effects of the postmodernist thought that has
seeped into our cultural understandings. My aim in this Article is to examine
selected aspects of constitutional law in this first decade of the twenty-first
century in order to appraise the extent to which postmodern insights are
affecting its development. To do so, I will first define and describe
postmodernism and indicate the particular aspects of postmodernist thought that
are most germane to constitutional law. In succeeding sections, I will examine
selected areas in which I believe that postmodernist thought has had a distinct
effect on the development of contemporary constitutional law and offer some
general conclusions about the likely shape of future constitutional doctrine in
an increasingly postmodern age.
This is a broad topic; hence, a few disclaimers and caveats are in order. I
do not contend that we are all postmodemists; indeed, there is ready evidence to
suggest that a great many people are antagonistic to postmodemism. Indeed, a
great deal of what is often labeled the "culture wars" is a divide between
postmodern, modem, and pre-modern sensibilities. Thus, I contend only that
postmodern thought has had profound influence on our culture's world view. I
do not contend that constitutional law is in the thrall of postmodernism; I do
contend that postmodemism has had a significant, if unacknowledged and
sporadic, impact on constitutional law. Although the divide between
postmodern skepticism about certainty and those who cling to the promise of
certainty-whether they be Enlightenment rationalists, pre-modem
fundamentalists, or optimistic modernists--can mimic ancient debates of
constitutional interpretation, I do not wish to revisit old battlefields. Rather, I
aim to identify some of the present effects of postmodern thought on
constitutional doctrine and to hazard some views on the likely future effects on
constitutional law of a growing postmodern consciousness.
II. Postmodernism and Modernism
Postmodernism is a term much used and rarely defined. Most commonly,
it is thought to be an attitude of extreme skepticism about meaning, reality,
knowledge, and truth. According to Philosophy Professor Elizabeth Anderson,
postmodernism:
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[E]mbodies a skeptical sensibility that questions attempts to transcend our
situatedness by appeal to such ideas as universality, necessity, objectivity,
rationality, essence, unity, totality, foundations, and ultimate Truth and
Reality. It stresses the locality, partiality, contingency, instability,
uncertainty, ambiguity and essential contestability of any particular account
of the world, the self, and the good.'
Postmodernism is a system of thought that asserts that our notion of "reality is
'discursively constructed,' ,2 meaning that "our minds grasp things not as they
are 'in themselves' but only through concepts, signified by words."3 On one
level there is nothing new in this; nearly a century ago Justice Holmes declared
that "[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used.",4 Postmodemists, however,
take Justice Holmes's observation to a deeper level. For example:
[Linguistic] signs get their meaning not from their reference to external
things but from their relations to all of the other signs in a system of
discourse, [which] entails that the introduction of new signs (or elimination
of old ones) will change the meanings of the signs that were already in use.
Signs therefore do not have a fixed meaning over time.
The consequences of this are radical and destabilizing:
There can be no complete, unified theory of the world that captures the
whole truth about it. Any such theory will contain a definite set of terms.
This entails that it cannot express all conceptual possibilities. For a
discourse that contained different terms would contain meanings not
available in the discursive field of the theory that claims completeness.
Thus, the selection of any particular theory or narrative is an exercise of
'power'-to exclude certain possibilities from thought and to authorize
others.6
Postmodemism is not just a linguistic theory; it also asserts that its ideas
about language are generally applicable to "social practices" because:
1. Elizabeth Anderson, Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, in THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed. 2004), http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/feminism-epistemology (defining and documenting the
developments in feminist epistemology) (last visited Oct. 20, 2006) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (concluding that a taxpayer's stock
dividend was not income).
5. Anderson, supra note 1.
6. Id.
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[A]ctions and practices are linguistic signs.... Just as words get their
meaning from their relations to other words rather than from their relation
to some external reality, so do actions get their meaning from their relations
to other actions, rather than from their relation to some pre-linguistic realm
of human nature or natural law.7
A baseball umpire commands authority by virtue of the deference the other
participants display toward him, not because he possesses some underlying
normative skill or authority.8 Social practices extend even to our conceptions
of self. Postmodernists contend that we apprehend who we are through the
signs and actions that surround us:
There is no unified self [that lies outside the realm of linguistic signs and
actions[;]. . . the self is not free to make of these [signs] whatever it wants,
but finds itself entangled in a web of meanings not of its own creation. Our
identities are socially imposed, not autonomously created. 9
Even then, we do not occupy a single identity. A person may be
simultaneously a man, a law professor, a hunter of big game, an avid
photographer, of African ancestry, a father, a widower, a Republican, an
atheist, a recovering alcoholic, an Episcopalian, a Chicago Bears fan, and on
and on until terminal identity fatigue sets in. In that sense, we can choose who
we are, at least among the socially constructed identities open to our choice.
At its most extreme, postmodernists assert that even the natural world is
socially constructed, but these claims:
[D]o not assert that the external world would disappear if people stopped
talking about it. Rather, they assert a kind of nominalism: that the world
does not dictate the categories we use to describe it, that innumerable
incompatible ways of classifying the world are available to us, and
therefore that the selection of any one theory is a choice that cannot be
justified by appeal to "objective" truth or reality. Even the ways we draw
our distinctions between mind and body, ideas and objects, discourse and
reality, are contestable.' 0
7. Id.
8. Indeed, the fact that football referees now routinely review their decisions on the field
by resorting to recorded images of the action in question suggests how little underlying
normatively objective authority they possess. Nevertheless, after they declare their final
decision-rendered in accord with a standard of review of"indisputable visual evidence"---the
conventions of deference descend again and cause a stadium of 50,000 people or more to
acquiesce in the decision, however immediately vocal may be their disagreement.
9. Anderson, supra note 1.
10. Id.
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Modernism, by contrast, may be seen as a way station between
Enlightenment rationality and postmodernism. Indeed, modernism arguably
begins with the Enlightenment and its rejection of pre-modem epistemology
and sources of authority." Pre-modern thought was characterized by a strong
belief in ultimate, unchangeable truth that came from divine sources. Man's
task was to understand God's revelation. Enlightenment thinkers did not so
much dispute the idea of ultimate truth as to substitute reason, logic, and
empirical observation as the sources for apprehending objective truth. Man's
task was to understand the observable universe. 12 As humanity marched from
the Renaissance to the cusp of the twentieth century, modernism acquired a
new meaning. Though this latter-day modernism is often defined in terms "of
experimental and avant-garde trends in the literature (and other arts) of the
early 20th century ... [that] disengaged from bourgeois values and disturbed
their [audience] by adopting complex and difficult new forms and styles,"' 3 it
acquired a cultural sensibility well beyond the arts. Unlike the Enlightenment
rationalists, who thought that everything could be understood with sufficient
rational inquiry, 14 latter-day modernism recognized that the world is
fragmentary, lacking any overarching pattern, and that we apprehend it in
piecemeal fashion. 15 The modernist challenge was "to reestablish a coherence
of meaning from fragmentary forms."'16
Latter-day modernism shares with postmodernism "an emphasis on
fragmented forms, discontinuous narratives, and random[ness,]"' 7 but
postmodemism "differs from modernism in its attitude toward... these
trends.' 8 Although modernism regards "fragmentation as something tragic,
11. See CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS 140 ("Modernist literature is
characterized chiefly by the rejection of the 19th-century traditions and of their consensus
between author and reader....").
12. See id. at 69 (defining "enlightenment"). The definition states:
[Enlightenment is] man's emancipation from his self-incurred immaturity.
Enlightenment thinking encouraged rational scientific inquiry, humanitarian
tolerance, and the idea of universal human rights. In religion, it usually involved
the skeptical rejection of superstition, dogma, and revelation in favour of
"Deism"-a belief confined to those universal doctrines supposed to be common to
all religions ....
Id.
13. Id. at 140.
14. See id. at 69 (defining the Enlightenment).
15. See id. at 140 (defining modernism).
16. CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS 140.
17. Mary Klages, Postmodernism, http://www.colorado.edu/English/ENGL2012Klages
/pomo.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. Id.
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something to be lamented and mourned as a loss... [p]ostmodemism...
doesn't lament the idea of fragmentation, provisionality, or incoherence, but
rather celebrates that. The world is meaningless? ... [L]et's just play with
nonsense."19
What should we expect to observe if a postmodern sensibility has taken
root in our culture? Apart from unintelligible jargon,20 the answer might
depend on how broadly held is this point of view. If postmodern tenets are the
province of a tiny band of intellectuals holding forth over espresso and
Gauloises at Le Deux Magots, its effects may not be readily observable much
outside of Paris's Sixth Arrondissement. But if these tenets are readily
accepted by ordinary people-those who do not spend their days in
contemplation of the deeper mysteries of epistemology-we might expect to
see much more significant effects. In general, I think that the core of
postmodemism-skepticism about truth, meaning, knowledge, morals, and
even reality-is widely accepted with varying degrees of commitment by
Western societies. 21 Because I do not pretend to be an expert in other cultures
19. Id.
20. See ALAN SOKAL & JEAN BRICMONT, FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: POSTMODERN
INTELLECTUALS' ABUSE OF SCIENCE 4 (1998) (describing the aim of the book to show the
repeated abuse of terminology in the sciences and to analyze the postmodern confusions); see
also Richard Dawkins, Postmodernism Disrobed, 394 NATURE 141, 141 (July 9, 1998)
(commenting on Fashionable Nonsense). Here is the opening portion of Dawkins' review of
Sokal and Bricmont's book:
Suppose you are an intellectual impostor with nothing to say, but with strong
ambitions to succeed in academic life, collect a coterie of reverent disciples and
have students around the world anoint your pages with respectful yellow
highlighter. What kind of literary style would you cultivate? Not a lucid one,
surely, for clarity would expose your lack of content. The chances are that you
would produce something like the following:
We can clearly see that there is no bi-univocal correspondence between linear
signifying links or archi-writing, depending on the author, and this multireferential,
multi-dimensional machinic catalysis. The symmetry of scale, the transversality,
the pathic non-discursive character of their expansion: all these dimensions remove
us from the logic of the excluded middle and reinforce us in our dismissal of the
ontological binarism we criticised previously.
This is a quotation from the psychoanalyst F6lix Guattari, one of many fashionable
French "intellectuals" outed by Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont [in Fashionable
Nonsense].
Id.
21. On truth, see DOUGLAS V. PORPORA, LANDSCAPES OF THE SOUL: THE Loss OF MORAL
MEANING IN AMERICAN LIFE 2 (2001) (noting that this generation is postmodem and no longer
believes in truth but rather is highly skeptical about moral truths); see also ALLAN BLOOM, THE
CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 25 (1987) (noting the widely held belief that what is true is up
to each individual); ERNEST HEMINGWAY, TRUE AT FIRST LIGHT: A FICTIONAL MEMOIR 189
(1999) ("[Almost nothing was true and especially not in Africa. In Africa a thing is true at first
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(it is hard enough to understand American culture), I will confine my thoughts
on this point to the United States. What follows is a brief overview of some
salient aspects of postmodern sensibility on American society.
A. Truth and Morality: From the Universal to the Unique
A central postmodern claim is that there can be no such thing as objective
truth or objective morality. Whatever is claimed to be true or moral is
inescapably the product of the unique circumstances of the claimant. We see
truth and morality through the deterministic lens of our culture, our socially
constructed identity, and the accumulation of our unique life experiences.
Postmodern theorists assert that it is manifest error to assume that our unique
perspectives can be generalized and turned into universal and objective
statements of truth and morality.
22
Contemporary Americans appear to agree with the postmodern claim. A
2002 opinion poll revealed that only 22% of Americans, and 6% of teenagers,
regard moral truth to be absolute and unchanging. 23 Sixty-four percent of
adults and 83% of teenagers think moral truth depends on the situation.24 The
light and a lie by noon.... ."). On truth and morality, see Barna Research Group, Americans
Are Most Likely to Base Truth on Feelings (Feb. 12, 2002), http://www.barna.org/Flex
Page.aspx?Page=BarnaUpdate&BarnaUpdatelD=106 [hereinafter Barna, Truth Poll] (finding
that 22% of Americans consider truth to be absolute and unchanging, a plurality of adults (30%)
and teenagers (38%) base moral or ethical choices on "whatever feels right or comfortable in
that situation") (last visited Oct. 20, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
On reality, see The Harris Poll, Perceptions of Risks: The Public Overestimates the Risks of
Most Major Diseases and Types ofAccidents-Breast and Prostate Cancer in Particular (Jan.
27, 1999), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=44 (revealing that the
public wildly overestimates the risk of contracting breast or prostate cancer, the HIV/AIDS
virus, being injured in an auto accident, contracting lung cancer or diabetes, suffering a stroke
or heart attack, or being shot or hurt by a stranger) (last visited Oct. 20, 2006) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
22. Any discussion of a divide between believers in absolutely fixed moral standards and
those who reject all possibility of any absolutes must acknowledge that there is some middle
ground. Thoughtful adherents to the fixed standard position will readily concede the distinction
between defeasible moral standards and nondefeasible standards. Only the latter represent truly
fixed moral standards. A defeasible standard is one that can be defeated in order to advance a
more important moral standard, as, for example, if I lie to save your life from murderous
captors. One might argue about the composition of the set of nondefeasible standards, or even
the existence of that category; for my purposes I am assuming that those who believe in
absolutely fixed standards believe in the existence of nondefeasible standards.
23. Barna, Truth Poll, supra note 21.
24. Id.
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remainder of the respondents do not know,25 which can hardly be counted as a
commitment to objective moral truth.26
A similar such poll conducted in 2005 showed that:
About half of all adults (54%) claim that they make their moral choices on
the basis of specific principles or standards they believe in. Other common
means of making moral choices include doing what feels right or
comfortable (24%), doing whatever makes the most people happy or causes
the least conflict (9%), and pursuing whatever produces the most positive
outcomes for the person (7%).17
Because over half of these respondents based their moral choices upon
"principles or standards they believe in" it might be thought that they are
relying upon standards that they believe to be absolute and unchanging. This
conclusion is unwarranted; it does not account for the possibility that the
"principles and standards" in which the 2005 respondents believe are highly
flexible and situational. The 2005 survey disclosed that a mere 16% of adults
"claim they make their moral choices based on the content of the Bible, ' 28 a
source that for believers is likely to be regarded as providing fixed, absolute
standards. Of course, some of the 54% who base moral choice upon principles
in which they believe may be relying upon non-religious standards that they
believe to be absolute, but there is no indication of this in the polling data.
When the 2002 and 2005 surveys are considered together, we can only safely
conclude that some number of Americans that is very likely less than a majority
purport to rely upon fixed reference points in navigating the high seas of
morality.
Further support for this tentative conclusion can be gleaned by considering
the views of Americans who profess to be "born again" by virtue of their belief
25. Id.
26. Other attitudes revealed by this poll include the following: Thirty percent of adults
and 38% of teenagers polled agree with the notion that moral or ethical choices should be based
on "whatever feels right or comfortable in that situation." Ten percent of adults and 16% of
teenagers base such choices on "whatever will produce the most positive [personal] outcome."
Another 14% of adults and 23% of teenagers ground moral and ethical choices on a
combination of whatever produces the least conflict, makes others happy, is what family and
friends expect of them, or is what they "believe most other people would do in that situation."
Only 19% of adults and 9% of teenagers follow Biblical or religious standards in making moral
and ethical choices, and another 15% of adults and 10% of teenagers follow parentally-derived
standards for making such choices.
27. Barna Research Group, Most Adults Feel Accepted by God, But Lack a Biblical
Worldview (Aug. 9, 2005) http://www.barna.org/FlexPage.aspx?Page=BarnaUpdate&Bama
UpdatelD=194 (last visited Oct. 20, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. Id.
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in Jesus Christ as their savior from eternal damnation. 29 Born again believers
would seem to be perhaps the best candidates for a rock-sold belief in absolute
moral truth. Not so. According to one Barna report, "[o]nly a minority of born-
again adults (44%) and a tiny proportion of born-again teenagers (9%) are
certain that absolute moral truth exists. 30 The 2002 polling data summarized
above reveals that only 34% of born-again adults and a mere 9% of born-again
teens believe that moral truth is absolute and unchanging, while 54% of born-
again adults and 76% of born-again teenagers believe that moral truth depends
on the situation.31 The remainder, of course, do not know.32 Faith in God or
reliance upon religious principles for moral truth is not the only indicator of
belief or non-belief in objective moral truth; far more telling is the considerable
majority of adult Americans who frankly aver that they rely upon an expedient
foundation for their moral and ethical beliefs and choices.
Perhaps even more revealing are the attitudes of teenagers. A mere 9%
rely upon traditional religious principles to find moral truth and only 19% rely
on the combination of religious principles and parentally-instilled values.33 Nor
is there good reason to think that parentally-derived values consist of moral
absolutes when only 22% of adults think that moral absolutes exist. 34 A
homely but telling measure of the decline of objective moral truth in America is
that 86% of American teenagers believe "that music piracy ... either is morally
acceptable or is not even a moral issue. Just 8% claim that such activities are
morally wrong.
35
Teens are just the leading edge of a larger world view. It does not seem
particularly noteworthy any longer to note that college students do not believe
29. Barna, Truth Poll, supra note 21 (defining born-again Christian).
30. William Lobdell, Pollster Prods Christian Conservatives, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14,2002,
at B22.
31. Barna, Truth Poll, supra note 21.
32. Of course, born-again Christians are not the only people who might be thought to be
likely believers in absolute moral truth. I use born-again Christians because polling data is
available and because a significant portion of American Christians, although a relatively small
minority, are likely to fall into this category. See, e.g., Barry A. Kosmin, Egon Mayer & Ariela
Keysar, The Graduate Ctr. of the City Univ. of N.Y., American Religious Identification Survey
(2001), http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/researchstudies/aris.pdf (involving a sample size of
about 50,000 people asked to self-identify their religious affiliation) (last visited Oct. 20, 2006)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. Bama, Truth Poll, supra note 21.
34. Id.
35. Barna Research Group, Fewer Than 1 in 10 Teenagers Believe that Music Piracy is
Morally Wrong (Apr. 26, 2004), http://www.barna.org/FlexPage.aspx?Page=BarnaUpdate
&BarnaUpdatelD=162 (last visited Oct. 20, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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in truth and are particularly skeptical about claims of moral truth.36 The
postmodern sensibility of American college students is mirrored by the attitudes
of Americans both younger and older, and even seems to be shared to a
surprising degree by those who profess to hold to the most traditional and
fundamental form of Christian belief. Whether or not we know it, most of us
are postmodern. We need not dally over espresso, croissants, and Le Monde at
Les Deux Magots; we are thoroughly postmodern Millies as we sip our lattes,
nibble our muffins, and read USA Today or The New York Times in Starbucks.
B. The Paradox of Individualism: The Social Construction of Narcissism
The postmodem contention is that there is no coherent self that lies outside
the disparate social discourses that inevitably construct us. Others, such as
prominent psychologist Robert Coles, maintain that the self is "the only or main
form of (existential) reality. 3 7 These views may not be contradictory. A staple
of the American experience has been the focus on the primacy of the
individual, but simultaneously existing with that focus is a collectivist impulse
that has manifested itself in such disparate ways as utopian communities 38 and
the resolution of legal disputes pitting individual entitlement against the
commonweal in favor of the community.39 The paradox of our individualism
may be that it is a product of our social environment--our individualism is
36. PORPORA, supra note 21, at 2 (describing the postmodern college student).
37. Robert Coles, Civility and Psychology, 109 DAEDALUS, Summer 1980, at 137.
38. See, e.g., KARL J.R. ARNDT, GEORGE RAPP'S HARMONY SOCIETY: 1785-1847 (rev. ed.
1972) (exploring the Harmony Society in Pennsylvania); KARL J.R. ARNDT, GEORGE RAPP'S
SUCCESSORS AND MATERIAL HEIRS: 1847-1916 (1971) (continuing the story of the Harmony
Society); HUNTER JAMES, THE QUIET PEOPLE OF THE LAND: A STUDY OF THE NORTH CAROLINA
MORAVIANS IN REVOLUTIONARY TIMES (1976) (studying the Moravians); JOHN MCKELvIE
WHITWORTH, GOD'S BLUEPRINTS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THREE UTOPIAN SECTS (1975)
(examining the Shakers, the Oneida community, and the Bruderhofcommunity-the Society of
Brothers); WILLIAM E. WILSON, THE ANGEL AND THE SERPENT: A STORY OF NEW HARMONY
(1964) (documenting the story of New Harmony); MARGUERITE YOUNG, ANGEL IN THE FOREST
(1945) (studying the society of New Harmony, Indiana).
39. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817-21 (1880) (upholding the statute
banning lotteries even though a private party had been granted the right to conduct a lottery; the
"legislature cannot bargain away the police power"); Morton J. Horwitz, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860, at 47-53 (1977) (discussing New England's Mill Acts and
ensuing litigation); Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420,423 (1837) (finding no
violation of a state charter granting Charles River Bridge the right to erect a toll bridge by a later
charter of a competing free bridge); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,447-
48 (1934) (upholding a moratorium on enforcement of mortgages against a contract clause
challenge).
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socially constructed. At the same time, we live in constant tension between our
impulse to seek isolation and our need to associate.
Much has been made in recent years of the increasing tendency of
Americans to wall themselves off from the larger community, whether through
gated private enclaves40 or by virtue of a relentless quest for self-fulfillment. 41
As early as 1978 Christopher Lasch could contend that "Americans have
retreated to purely personal preoccupations, ,42 and that to "live for the moment
is the prevailing passion-to live for yourself."4 3 In his 1976 essay, "The Me
Decade and the Third Great Awakening," Tom Wolfe asserted that, until the
latter part of the twentieth century, people "have not lived their lives as if
thinking, 'I have only one life to live.' Instead they have lived as if they are
living their ancestors' lives and their offsprings' lives .... ,44 By the 1970s the
human potential movement had changed all that. Whether rooted in Carl
Jung's work on the process of individuation or any other source, the 1970s
produced a wave of absorption with self-development, perhaps best captured by
mythic scholar Joseph Campbell's injunction to "follow your bliss.,
45
40. See generally EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA:
GATED COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997), Haya El Nasser, Gated Communities More
Popular, and Not Just for the Rich, USA TODAY, Dec. 15, 2002, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/ nation/2002-12-15-gated-usat x.htm ("The desire to lock out
the outside world cuts across all income groups, according to the first Census Bureau survey to
measure how many Americans live in walled or gated communities.").
41. See, e.g., Tom Wolfe, The Me Decade and the Third Great Awakening, in MAUVE
GLOVES & MADMEN, CLUTTER & VINE 126 (1976) (describing the 1970s as the "Me Decade").
The 1970s were, of course, the Me Decade, although some contend that the preoccupation with
self has continued since then. See, e.g., Victor J. Stenger, The Me Decade Continues,
http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/RelSci/Me.html ("[T]he decade of the 1980s was
characterized by an unprecedented level of individual self-absorption.") (last visited Oct. 20,
2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Stenger is a professor emeritus of
physics and astronomy, University of Hawaii, and adjunct professor of philosophy at the
University of Colorado. Stenger Biography, http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/ (last
visited Oct. 20, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
42, CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF
DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS 4 (1978) (describing the dying culture of competitive
individualism).
43. Id. at 5.
44. Wolfe, supra note 41, at 166.
45. See, e.g., JOSEPH CAMPBELL, PATHWAYS TO BLISS: MYTHOLOGY AND PERSONAL
TRANSFORMATION (David Kudler, ed., 2004) (suggesting that the myth offered a framework for
personal growth and would lead to a life in tune with one's nature to a pathway of bliss). An
even better illustration of the degree to which Campbell's trademark statement has achieved
iconic status is to note that Amazon.com will sell you "Follow Your Bliss: 52 Inspiration
Cards," containing pithy nuggets of wisdom from Joseph Campbell. Amazon Follow Your Bliss
Cards, see http://www.amazon. com/gp/product/1577315162/qid=l 137622002/sr- 1-1/ref=sr_1
1/104-1020953-1050355?s= books&v=glance&n=283155 (last visited Oct. 20, 2006) (on file
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Exploration of this exciting new frontier of the self did not end with the
1970s. The "Me Decade" grinds on and on, piling one decade after another in a
new age of endless self-discovery and self-fulfillment. In the 1980s the famous
study Habits of the Heart46 documented American self-absorption and the
malaise created by social isolation resulting from the inward search for self-
fulfillment. The authors of Habits assert that "[i]ndividualism lies at the very
core of American culture, 47 but identify American individualism as
characterized by four distinct strands: "biblical individualism," "civic
individualism," "utilitarian individualism," and "expressive individualism.
' 48
Both Biblical and civic individualism place "individual autonomy in a context
of moral and religious obligation. 4 9  By contrast, both utilitarian and
expressive individualism see the "individual [as] prior to society, which comes
into existence only through the voluntary contract of individuals trying to
maximize their self-interest."5 ° Utilitarian individualism "takes as a given
certain basic human appetites and fears.., and sees human life as an effort by
individuals to maximize their self-interest relative to these given ends....
Utilitarian individualism has an affinity to a basically economic understanding
of human existence." 51 Expressive individualism "arose in opposition to
utilitarian individualism [and] holds that each person has a unique core of
feeling and intuition that should unfold or be expressed if individuality is to be
realized. ... [It] shows affinities with the culture of psychotherapy.,
52
Habits of the Heart chronicles "the growing strength of modem
individualism at the expense of the civic and biblical traditions"53 and raises the
question of "whether an individualism in which the self has become the main
form of reality can really be sustained. 54 The authors of Habits conclude that
the "quest for purely private fulfillment is illusory: it often ends in emptiness
instead." 55  Rather, they conclude that "private fulfillment and public
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
46. ROBERT N. BELLAH, RIcHARD MADSEN, WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANN SWIDLER, &
STEPHEN M. TiPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDrviDUALsM AND COMMrrMENT IN AMEICAN LiFE
(updated ed. 1996) (studying American values and ideas).
47. Id. at 142.
48. Id. (listing the four traditions of individualism and noting their similarities and
differences).
49. Id. at 143.
50. Id.
51. BELLAH ET AL., supra note 46, at 336.
52. Id. at 333-34 (emphasis omitted).
53. Id. at 143.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 163.
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involvement are not antithetical." The Habits authors endorse the view that
"the private and the public are not mutually exclusive, not in competition, [but]
are, instead, two halves of a whole... [which] work together... to create and
nurture one another. 5 6 The quandary presented is that although "perhaps only
the civic and biblical forms of individualism-forms that see the individual in
relation to a larger whole, a community and a tradition-are capable of
sustaining genuine individuality and nurturing both public and private life[,]
' 57
those forms are no longer realistically available: "[A] return to traditional
forms would be to return to intolerable discrimination and oppression. 58 The
question posed by Habits "is whether the older civic and biblical traditions have
the capacity to reformulate themselves while simultaneously remaining faithful
to their own deepest insights. 59  They conclude "that though the
[Enlightenment] processes of separation and individuation were necessary to
free us from the tyrannical structures of the past, they must be balanced by a
renewal of commitment and community if they are not to end in self-destruction
or turn into their opposites., 60 Habits of the Heart documents the increasing
tendency of Americans in the 1980s to define themselves in splendid isolation
from others and warns of the psychic poverty of doing so. Left unanswered
was the question of how it is, if the self is socially constructed, that this
increasing self-absorption came about.
A partial answer arrived with the publication of Robert Putnam's Bowling
Alone: The Collapse and Revival ofAmerican Community,6 1 written at the turn
of the millennium, which purported to document the erosion of America's
social capital-"social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity" 62 -in
the latter part of the twentieth century. Putnam notes that social capital can
take many forms, from formal to informal,63 benign or malign,64 and, most
56. BELLAH ET AL., supra note 46, at 163 (quoting PARKER J. PALMER, THE COMPANY OF
STRANGERS: CHRISTIANS AND THE RENEWAL OF AMERICA'S PUBLIC LIFE 31 (1981)).
57. Id. at 143.
58. Id. at 144.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 277.
61. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNrrY (2000) (arguing that America has undergone a collapse of social capital in the last
few decades).
62. Id. at 21.
63. See id. at 22 (contrasting such formal ties as the PTA with "a pickup basketball
game").
64. See id. (noting a Ku Klux Klan leader's declaration, "Really, we're just like the Lions
or the Elks.... ").
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importantly, bridging and bonding. 65 Bridging social capital is "outward
looking" and links people "across diverse social cleavages" for common
purposes such as religious faith, social service, political change, or simple
networking.66 Bonding social capital is "inward looking," calculated to
"reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups," and is manifested by
such groups as "ethnic fraternal organizations [and] exclusive country clubs. 
6 7
In either case, however, social capital is entirely the product of a conception of
self that is socially constructed. Bowling Alone both traces the decline of
American civic engagement and attendant social capital and attempts to identify
the factors that have produced that decline.68 The most significant factor,
according to Putnam, is generational change, with the remaining factors being
the impact of television and other isolating electronic entertainment, economic
pressures, and suburban sprawl, in descending order.69 Putnam attributes about
two-thirds of the trend toward isolation to the combination of electronic
entertainment (particularly television and computer media) and generational
change.7° Putnam contends that the relative withdrawal of younger people is
not entirely attributable to electronic media and that such media may account
for the withdrawal of some older Americans. 7' It is also clear, however, that
the ubiquity of television and other electronic entertainment media is a defining
aspect of contemporary American life and that those most facile with these
media are the young.72 All of these media, but particularly television, are
characterized by rapid and disjunctive imagery, a fragmentation of experience
that is characteristic of the postmodem world.73
65. See id. ("Of all the dimensions along which forms of social capital vary, perhaps the
most important is the distinction between bridging (inclusive) and bonding (or exclusive).").
66. See PUTNAM, supra note 61, at 22-23 (discussing inclusive social capital and its
sources).
67. See id. (discussing exclusive social capital as a component of self).
68. See id. at 31-180 (examining four primary sources for the decline ofsocial capital and
subsequent social and cultural impacts).
69. See id. at 283-84 (ranking the factors contributing to the decline of social capital and
subsequent social and cultural impacts).
70. See id. at 284 (providing general statistical estimates on the influence of the media on
social isolation).
71. See PUTNAM, supra note 61, at 284 (stating that television has affected both younger
and older generations' community involvement).
72. See id. at 257 (discussing the amount of exposure to media the average sixteen year
old experiences).
73. JERRY MANDER, FOUR ARGUMENTS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF TELEVISION 157-64
(1978) (characterizing television and its effects on viewers).
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Although it might appear that the trend toward isolation and social
disengagement is at odds with the postmodern contention that the self is
necessarily socially constructed, that appearance is deceptive. Bowling Alone
identifies a host of societal factors that operate to construct a socially
disengaged self.74 Moreover, an incoherent, disconnected culture is likely to
enhance social isolation. Postmodernism embraces the incoherence of
existence and celebrates its lack of meaning, so it follows that socially
constructed postmodern man should be comfortable with a world of nonsense.
He is likely to revel in his ability to retreat into a walled, gated compound at the
wheel of a sleek Mercedes-Benz, setting his own terms for interaction with
others. He is comfortable with a thoroughly mediated relationship with the
larger world. "If this is nonsense, make the most of it," he might say. If all is
nonsense, why not seek fulfillment in material possessions?
That postmodern world is reflected back to us through such media as
computer games. Consider The Sims, a game published by Maxis, in which the
Sims are computer people living in a world in which "everything is an object
that yields a measurable benefit when some action is performed upon it."
75
Another person is merely a:
[C]onversational object that.., is more or less analogous to the couch he's
sitting on.... The Sims live in a perfect consumer society where more stuff
makes you happier, period. There's nothing else. So your goals in SimLife
are purely material: ... more money ... more furniture, a bigger house and
more toys.... Even relationships, ultimately, are a means to that end....
Reproduction is an important game strategy because you need children to
socialize with the neighbors' children so you can socialize with their
parents, and you need to socialize with neighborhood parents to get ahead
professionally.
76
Lest one think The Sims are just a figment of a computer programmer's
imagination, consider that in 1998 three-quarters of incoming UCLA freshmen
declared that financial success was a very important personal objective.77 In
74. See PUTNAM, supra note 61, at 283 (listing four major factors leading to social
disengagement).
75. See J.C. Herz, The Sims Who Die with the Most Toys Win, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,2000,
at GI 0, available at http://partners.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/02/circuits/articles/l0game.html
(discussing the goals and scenarios present in The Sims computer game) (last visited Feb. 22,
2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Wikipedia Entry on The
Sims, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TheSims ("The Sims is a strategic life simulation computer
game... [and] is a simulation of the day-to-day activities of one or more virtual people (dubbed
'Sims') in a suburban household.") (last visited Oct. 20, 2006) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
76. Herz, supra note 75, at G10.
77. See PuTNAM, supra note 61, at 260 (providing statistical comparisons of community
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1996 about twice as many adults "aspired to a lot of money" than those who
"aspired to contribute to society. 7 8
Some postmodern academics living with milk crate bookcases may
express doubt that there is much linkage between postmodem thought and crass
"me-first" materialism, but that simply represents the chasm between the
intellectual construct of postmodemism and its popular application. Though
The Sims is a parody of our culture, it is "also disturbing in its accuracy, to the
extent that.., we treat each other as objects, as a means to an end. 7 9 And we
do. Contemporary culture is characterized by a relentless commodification of
nearly everything. 0 Postmodern literary critic Frederic Jameson, for example,
argues that in the postmodern era all human activities are commodified,
reduced to their exchange or consumption value. 81 The process is ubiquitous:
marriage, once thought to be a commitment "for better or worse," is a
commodity to be discarded when one's partner fails to deliver on the implicit
bargain; cultural traditions, once a folklore legacy, are now appropriated into
the exchange economy;8 2 childhood, once thought to be an innocent haven from
the hurly-burly adult world,83 has become commodified through fashion, 84 child
beauty pageants,85 and a broad range of other commercial exploitations of
values among college freshman).
78. See id. at 273 (finding that 63% of American adults want a lot of money; while 32%
desire to contribute to society).
79. Herz, supra note 75, at G10.
80. Commodification is the process of turning something into a commodity-an article of
exchange value-tfhat was previously not treated as susceptible to commercial exchange. See
Commodification, http://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/c/o.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2006)
(defining the term as "the transformation of relationships, formerly untainted by commerce, into
commercial relationships, relationships of buying and selling") (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
81. See FREDERIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE
CAPITALISM 387, 398 (1991) (discussing the emergence of commodification as a type of
ideology).
82. See, e.g., SusAN SCAFI, WHO OwNs CULTuRE? APPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTcrrY IN
AMERICAN LAW 5-12 (2005) (discussing the appropriations of cultural traditions and symbols
into the mainstream economy). Consider, for example, the commercial popularity of recordings
of Western monks intoning Gregorian chants or Buddhist monks chanting in prayer.
83. The loss of childhood innocence cannot be attributed to postmodemism, however.
Only in late modernity, and then only in wealthy industrial societies, were families sufficiently
free of economic pressure to grant children a reprieve from adult labors. See DANIEL THOMAS
COOK, THE COMMODIFICATION OF CHILDHOOD (2004) (discussing the change in the economic
value of children between 1870 and 1930). But the commodification of childhood itself, a
distinct category, is a postmodern phenomenon. See id at 10-11 (discussing the growth of
children's consumer culture).
84. Consider the rise of such niche retailing as "Baby Gap" stores.
85. See, e.g, Universal Royalty Beauty Pageants, http://www.universalroyalty.com (last
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childhood. 6 Postmodem guru Jurgen Habermas sums it up when he asserts
that the world of commodified exchange appropriates articles previously
immune from exchange87 and, I add, does so relentlessly.
Although modernists and premodemists find this condition disquieting
and hunger for some connection to others and to forces larger than themselves
that lie outside the realm of commodities, postmodem man delights in the
incoherence of it all. Why bother about social connections if they are as
meaningless as everything else; unless, like The Sims, there is an instrumental
self-regarding reward for such connections? The resulting irony is that
postmodem culture tends to exacerbate trends toward an autonomous self, but
that very autonomy is socially constructed and thus far more illusory than real.
Perhaps this paradox, as well as the continuing divide between modem, pre-
modem, and postmodem sensibilities, helps to explain why current trends in
constitutional law appear simultaneously to rest on the notion of an autonomous
self and a socially constructed identity.8
There are no doubt other aspects of postmodern theory that can be
identified in our culture, 89 but I need not belabor the point. These salient
visited Oct. 10, 2006) (providing general child pageant information) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Sunburst USA Model Search Contest,
http://www.pageantinfo.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2006) (same) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also William J. Cromie, The Whys and Woes of Beauty Pageants,
HARV. UNIV. GAZETTE, June 8, 2000, available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette
/2000/06.08/beauty.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2006) (discussing the pressures and stereotypes
prevalent at beauty pageants) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Kareen
Nussbaum, Children and Beauty Pageants, available at http://www.minorcon.org/pageants.html
(last visited Oct. 24, 2006) (discussing the history and evolution of beauty pageants and their
effects on youth participants) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
86. See COOK, supra note 83, at 9 (discussing the rise of a commercial industry which
provides goods exclusively for children).
87. JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, VOLUME Two:
LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 322 (Thomas McCarthy trans.,
1987). Habermas notes:
The media of money and power can regulate the interchange relations between
system and lifeworld only to the extent that the products of the lifeworld have been
abstracted, in a manner suitable to the medium in question, into input factors for the
corresponding subsystem, which can relate to its environment only through its own
medium.
Id.
88. See infra notes 296-341 and accompanying text (discussing current trends in
constitutional law).
89. Consider, for example, the familiar example of Frank Gehry's architecture, which
appears to many observers to be a jumble of fragmented, unrelated pieces, as if some chaotic
and random force might have deposited the structure. "After the Tornado Passed" might be a
label for the genre. See also Nicolai Ouroussoff, Art andArchitecture, Together Again, N.Y.
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features of popular postmodernism, if you will, are sufficient to provide a
foundation for consideration of the question of whether, and to what extent,
constitutional law reflects the postmodern sensibility. A word of caution at the
outset: I do not claim that the bits and pieces of constitutional law that are
examined in the next section constitute a complete survey. My aim in this
Article is to provide sufficient illustration of the thesis to provoke further
commentary and reflection.
I1. Postmodern Influences in Constitutional Law
Our culture is not monolithically postmodern. Even if our culture has
incorporated the fundamental tenets of postmodern thought, however, there are
many possible reasons why constitutional law might not reflect that fact.90
There is a long tradition of constitutional adjudication which reflects past
cultural, doctrinal, or textual understandings. 91 Constitutional interpretation
derives from standard modes of argument: textual, structural, precedential,
historical, practical, and a sense of cultural values.92 Although people may
disagree about the relative importance of these factors, almost all serious
constitutional arguments draw upon these sources. 93 Of these factors, only the
last overtly invites cultural norms into the constitutional conversation.94 Thus,
if postmodern cultural sensibilities influence constitutional law, we should
expect that influence to be felt in the way in which the Court employs these
standard forms of argument. Text is often vague and elastic.95 Structure may
imply answers but is rarely dispositive.96 History is, itself, a matter of
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2006, at BI (depicting a rendering of the new Bowery home of the New
Museum of Contemporary Art, currently under construction, which "evokes a stack of
mismatched boxes on the verge of toppling over.").
90. See PHILIP BoBBrrT, CoNsTrrurioNAL FATE 3-23 (1982) (discussing the various
influences on the development of constitutional law and their impact on contemporary
jurisprudence).
91. See id. (discussing the historical element present in the evolution of practically all
constitutional jurisprudence).
92. See id. at 3-123 (presenting an analysis of the six primary modes of constitutional
argument and interpretation).
93. See id. at 1-8 (discussing the general sources of constitutional argument and
interpretation).
94. See id. at 93-97 (discussing the elements of an ethically-based constitutional
argument).
95. BOBBrrr, supra note 90, at 25-39 (discussing the application of a textual argument
and its inherent problems).
96. See id. at 74-93 (discussing the application of structural arguments and their inherent
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interpretation and informed conjecture and, in any case, leaves unresolved the
question of whether it should bind us now. 97 Matters of practicality are matters
of judgment, often informed but rarely controlled by current cultural and
political trends.98 Stare decisis is at its weakest in constitutional cases, where
the Court's "mistakes cannot be corrected by Congress."99 Indeed, the Supreme
Court provides frequent and recent reminders of its willingness to depart from
precedent. 00
Thus, if postmodernism is affecting constitutional interpretation, its effect
should be seen in the way the Court uses its traditional tools of adjudication.
One measure of that phenomenon is a recent appraisal of the Court's work by
Judge Richard Posner, who contends that the Supreme Court is a "political
court" ° 1 in the sense that constitutional adjudication, its primary task,
inherently involves the use and exercise of "discretionary power as capacious as
a legislature's [discretion]."'' 0 2  Because most of the truly interesting and
controversial constitutional "cases occupy a broad open area where the
conventional legal materials of decision run out [they] can be decided only on
the basis of a political judgment, and a political judgment cannot be called right
or wrong by reference to legal norms."10 3 Restraints upon the exercise of this
judgment do exist, but they are not powerful. To Judge Posner, the principal
implication from this state of affairs is that the Court (and individual Justices)
flaws).
97. See id. at 9-25 (discussing the rationale of the historical argument and its apparent
strength).
98. See id. at 59-74 (discussing the volatility of a prudential approach and the effect of
time on such arguments and decisions).
99. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004) (holding that the Constitution provides
equal protection only to persons and does not guarantee equal representation to political parties,
therefore precluding the existence of alleged political gerrymandering from judicial
intervention); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) ("Stare decisis is not an
inexorable command; rather, it 'is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of
adherence to the latest decision."' (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940))).
"This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases 'correction through
legislative action is practically impossible."' Id. (quoting Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
100. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (holding that the execution of
minors violates the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause and overruling
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)
(holding that criminal punishment of homosexual sodomy offends the substantive component of
due process and overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
101. Richard Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term, Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HAR. L. REv. 31, 39 (2005).
102. See id. at 40 (discussing the discretion involved in deciding constitutional cases).
103. Id.
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must choose either "to accept the political character of constitutional
adjudication wholeheartedly" and to act as a legislator '4 or, "feeling
bashful about being a politician in robes, to set ... a very high threshold
for voting to invalidate on constitutional grounds the action of another
branch of government." 0 5 Judge Posner prefers judicial modesty, which
he ultimately unites with pragmatic concerns to create a Posnerian
judicial pragmatism that is reluctant to exercise the veto cudgel of
judicial review. 
10 6
I have neither a quarrel with Judge Posner nor the desire to debate
his prescription for the political nature of constitutional adjudication;
rather, I prefer to rely upon his claim that political judgment is inherent
in constitutional adjudication as a prelude to my examination of some
areas of constitutional law that reflect the postmodern sensibility of our
culture. When all is said and done, one might say, "Well, of course; it's
just further proof that Posner is correct that constitutional law is
political." That response would be superficial. My aim is to demonstrate
that the exercise of the judicial discretion inherent in making
constitutional law, whether of a robust legislative sort or a modest,
pragmatic sort, is beginning to reflect the uncertainty, indeterminacy, and
chaotic nature of postmodern thought.
A. Lawrence v. Texas and the Illegitimacy of Morality
When Lawrence v. Texas 0 7 overruled Bowers v. Hardwick'0 8 in the
course of finding that Texas's ban on homosexual sexual behavior
violated a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause, the Court's doctrinal mechanism for doing so was to
apply minimal scrutiny and declare that the Texas statute was void
because it "furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual."' 09 Although
the Court in Lawrence did not specify what interests Texas advanced in
104. Id. at 54.
105. Id.
106. Posner, supra note 101, at 102 (advocating a judicial pragmatism that is restrained in
the exercise of its power).
107. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that criminal punishment
of homosexual sodomy offends the substantive component of due process).
108. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 198 (1986) (upholding a Georgia statute
criminalizing sodomy).
109. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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support of its statute, at oral argument counsel for Texas asserted that the
state's interest in proclaiming and enforcing a majority vision of morality
was sufficient,"0 as it was in Bowers." The Court thus rejected
promotion of morality as a legitimate state interest, at least when that
interest is pitted against state "intrusion into the personal and private life
of the individual."'"12 Although Lawrence raises a variety of issues," 3 I
wish to examine only the implications of Lawrence that bear upon the
claim that the case illustrates the effect of postmodernism on
constitutional law.
Lawrence implies that unadorned promotion of morality can never be
asserted successfully as a legitimate state interest. If so, all laws that
have only a moral foundation must be voided under minimal, or "rational-
basis," scrutiny, the default level of review in American constitutional
law. An early test of that premise was United States v. Extreme
Associates, Inc., 114 in which a federal district judge dismissed an
indictment for violating federal obscenity laws on the ground that the
only interest served by those laws, at least as applied to the defendants'
claim that they and their customers had a liberty interest protected by
substantive due process to buy and sell obscenity, was the promotion of
morality."15 The Third Circuit reversed, but in an opinion that merely
emphasized the Supreme Court's reminder to lower courts that they
should not "conclude our more recent cases have, by implication,
110. See Justices Hear Oral Argument on Texas Homosexual Sodomy Law, 71 U.S.L.WK.
3617, 3618 (2003) (stating that counsel for the respondent asserted that "morality is the basis for
the law"). In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor noted that Texas argued "that the statute
satisfies rational basis review because it furthers the legitimate governmental interest of the
promotion of morality." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111. See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). The Court stated:
[Tihe presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.., is said to be an inadequate rationale to
support the law [but law] is constantly based on notions of morality .... We do
not agree, and are unpersuaded that.., sodomy laws should be invalidated on this
basis ....
Id.
112. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
113. See, e.g., Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 946 (2004) (discussing the Supreme Court's adoption of the "form of
tiered scrutiny but snubb[ing] its substance").
114. See United States v. Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 595-96 (W.D. Pa. 2005)
(dismissing an indictment based on an unconstitutional federal obscenity statute), rev'd United
States v. Extreme Assocs., 431 F. 3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005).
115. See Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp 2d at 595-96 (dismissing an indictment based upon
a federal obscenity statute which violated due process).
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overruled an earlier precedent,"' 16 thus leaving the entire underlying issue
for later resolution by the Supreme Court."
17
Initially, obscenity was denied First Amendment protection because it was
"utterly without redeeming social importance."" 8 Although this may have been
a tacit embrace of moral objections to obscenity, in time the Court explicitly
recognized the "social interest in order and morality"" 9 as the legitimate basis
for excluding obscenity from the free expression guarantee12° Although
Extreme Associates correctly observed that the Supreme Court has expressly
concluded that neither free expression nor substantive due process protects the
sale of obscenity to willing, adult purchasers,' 2' the Court's decisions predate
116. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477,484 (1989) ("[I]f a precedent of this Court has direct
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the
Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.").
117. See United States v. Extreme Assocs., 431 F. 3d 150, 155-59 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding
constitutional the statutes forming the basis for the dismissal of the indictment).
118. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957) (holding that federal and state codes
governing the distribution of explicit material neither offend constitutional safeguards against
convictions based upon material protected under the First Amendment, nor fail to give citizens
inadequate notice of what is prohibited).
119. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. at 485) (holding that obscene materials do not acquire constitutional immunity
from regulation simply because they are shown only to consenting adults) (emphasis added in
Roth); see also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (stating
that obscenity may be banned because there is a "right of the Nation and of the States to
maintain a decent society").
120. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining obscenity to include
sexually explicit, prurient, and patently offensive material that, "taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value") (emphasis added). As Justice Brennan pointed
out in his dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I, the reason obscenity was denied constitutional
protection in Roth was because it utterly lacked any redeeming social value. Paris Adult
Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A necessary corollary to the Court's
approach to obscenity in Miller was the creation of a new rationale for obscenity's devalued
constitutional status. The majority in Paris Adult Theatre I offered several possibilities: some
utilitarian, "the tone of commerce in the great city centers," id. at 58; some based on moral
notions, "a legislature could legitimately act... to protect 'the social interest in order and
morality,"' id. at 61 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added in Roth)); and some based
on a combination of morals and utilitarianism, "commerce in obscene books, or public
exhibitions of [obscenity], have a tendency to exert a corrupting and debasing impact leading to
antisocial behavior." Id. at 63.
121. See United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 156-60 (3rd Cir. 2005)
(discussing United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 352-56 (1971) (finding that the Constitution
does not protect distribution of obscene material to willing adult recipients and that First
Amendment protection of private possession of obscenity does not extend to distribution);
United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1973) (declaring that the
right to private possession and receipt of obscenity does not create a right to distribute obscenity
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Lawrence's repudiation of morality as a legitimate state objective. At some
point the Supreme Court is likely to confront the issue raised in Extreme
Associates. When it does so, it will be forced to decide whether morality alone
may never constitute a legitimate state objective, is illegitimate only when
advanced to infringe upon the "personal and private life of the individual"'
122
(however bounded that may be), or is illegitimate only when used to support
criminal prohibition of private intimate sexual behavior between consenting




Nor is obscenity the only matter that is susceptible to challenge in the
wake of Lawrence. In his Lawrence dissent, Justice Scalia asserted that the
result of Lawrence would be to invalidate "[s]tate laws against bigamy, same-
sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication,
bestiality, and obscenity."' 24 This will be so if such laws are insupportable on
any ground other than the promotion of morality and if the Court concludes that
such an objective can never be legitimate. But it will not be so if the Court
gives effect to the caveats it raised in Lawrence, which suggest that Lawrence
ought not be invoked to void laws designed to address "public conduct or
prostitution,"'' 25 to protect minors126 or persons who are in relationships in
which they are vulnerable or "might be ... coerced,"'127 or to prevent "injury to
a person"'128 or "abuse of an institution the law protects."'129 Of course, the
focus on protection of minors, the vulnerable or coerced, and the prevention of
injury indicates that these caveats are founded upon recognition of the
legitimacy of utilitarian, rather than moral, reasons for regulation. Thus, laws
prohibiting bigamy, adult incest, adultery, and fornication might all be valid, at
least in some circumstances. In a similar utilitarian vein, laws banning
or to import it from abroad); United States. v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S.
123, 128 (1973) (stating that Congress can bar the importation of obscenity even if it is
imported for private use); United States. v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 141-43 (1973) (denying
substantive due process protection for the claimed right to transport or distribute obscenity);
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973) (finding that past substantive due
process cases do not include the right to watch obscene films in public within the right to
privacy).
122. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
123. Id. at 567.
124. Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 578.
126. See id. ("The present case does not involve minors.").
127. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
128. Id. at 567.
129. Id.
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fornication, adultery, and bigamy might also be enforced on the ground that
they prevent abuse of the institution of marriage, which is surely the principal
"institution the law protects" that Justice Kennedy had in mind when he
composed the majority opinion in Lawrence. Laws prohibiting bestiality might
be supportable on the utilitarian ground that it is possible that venereal diseases
may be transmitted from animals to humans. Perhaps prostitution may be
banned on similar public health grounds.
Are any of the Lawrence caveats supportable on purely moral grounds? In
the unlikely event that there are any laws banning masturbation, such laws
would appear to be void unless the concept of preventing "injury to a person" is
read to include injury to the actor and, even then, the only plausible injury is a
moral one. That would seem to be an insufficient basis to invoke the "injury to
persons" caveat, however, because the Court long ago in Roth expressly
repudiated the rationale advanced in Regina v. Hicklin 30 for outlawing
obscenity: "the tendency.., to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences.' 31 Stanley v. Georgia,'32 in which the Court
held that persons have a right grounded in both privacy and free expression to
possess obscene material in their own home, erased any lingering doubt about
the sufficiency of the interest of preventing self-pollution. 33 Perhaps morality
alone is enough to suppress obscene or indecent "public conduct."134 If so, we
must confront the spectacle conjured by Chief Justice Burger in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton:135 a couple "locked in a sexual embrace at high noon in
Times Square."136 Although there may be some utilitarian reasons to ban this
behavior, (such as its distraction to passing motorists, with attendant enhanced
130. Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 L.R.Q.B. 360 (holding the test of obscenity to be whether
the matter described: 1) tends to corrupt those open to immoral influence that may actually
obtain the material, 2) is intended to corrupt public morals, and 3) the material is obscene).
131. Id. at 371; see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,489 (1954) ("The Hicklin test...
must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press.").
132. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
133. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (holding that Stanley does not extend
to private possession of child pornography). Note that the case does not undercut this
conclusion because the Court's rationale for its decisions was the same utilitarian concerns that
motivated its decision in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764
(declaring that child pornography is expelled from the First Amendment in order to prevent the
harm to children resulting from its production); Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109-11 (pointing out that
the statute at issue did not seek to generally prohibit possession of obscene material in the home
but instead sought to prevent the harm to children caused by the production of child
pornography).
134. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
135. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
136. Id. at 67.
THE CONSTITUTION IN A POSTMODERN A GE
risk of traffic accidents), it is far more likely that the real objection to such
public displays is to protect the moral and aesthetic sensibilities of the public.
Finally, lying wholly outside the Lawrence caveats are any number of laws
that outlaw actions that primarily, if not exclusively, injure nobody other than
those who consent to the prohibited behavior. Such laws include bans on
duels, even absent physical injury to anyone, 137 and various animal spectacles
such as bearbaiting, cockfighting, and dogfights, 38 which are "'prohibited only
in part out of compassion for the suffering animals; the main reason they were
abolished was because it was felt that they debased and brutalized the citizenry
who flocked to witness such spectacles.'" 139 Though one might imagine some
utilitarian reasons for banning these activities, perhaps by analogy to the
secondary effects doctrine in free speech, the principal reason for invoking
criminal sanctions is to express moral disapproval.
The manner in which the Court deals with the issue of the legitimacy of
state promotion of morality will furnish additional data by which to assess the
influence of postmodern thought on its constitutional adjudication. A
conclusion that the use of law to preserve the majority's sense of morality is
illegitimate assumes that no moral perspective can be privileged. If no moral
perspective is privileged, it must be the case that there is no moral perspective
that is absolutely and universally true, or at least none that we can locate. That,
of course, is a fundamental tenet of postmodem thought.
One may glean further evidence of the Court's susceptibility to
postmodern thought from the way it deals with the intersection of its suggestion
that morality may be sufficient to support regulations of public conduct and its
holding that morality is insufficient to support intrusions on "the personal and
private life of the individual."1 40 To illustrate the problem, consider South
Dakota's recent change of the elements of its crime of public indecency.
Before July 1, 2006, a person in South Dakota committed the crime of public
indecency if, "with an immoral purpose" he or she "exposes his or her anus or
genitals in a public place where another may be present who will be offended
or alarmed by the person's act,"'141 but after that date he or she will commit the
137. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-39-1 (2005) (imposing criminal penalties for
engaging in a duel); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 662 (2005) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-12-1 (2006)
(same).
138. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-1004, 28-1005 (2005) (defining the activities of
bearbaiting, cockfighting, and dogfighting, making it a misdemeanor to engage in or be present
at these activities, and making it a felony if one violates the statute a second time).
139. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 68 n.15 (quoting IRVING KRiSTOL, ON THE
DEMOCRATIC IDEA IN AMERICA 33 (1972)).
140. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
141. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24-1.1 (2006).
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crime only "if the person, under circumstances in which that person knows that
his or her conduct is likely to annoy, offend, or alarm some other person,
exposes his or her anus or genitals in a public place where another may be
present who will be annoyed, offended, or alarmed by the person's act.'
42
South Dakota's substitution of the actor's knowledge "that his or her conduct is
likely to annoy, offend, or alarm some other person" for the actor's "immoral
purpose" as an element of the offense, may suggest that the South Dakota
legislature is skittish about the effect of Lawrence on its public indecency
statute and thinks that the new term is sufficiently utilitarian to pass
constitutional muster, or (which is much the same), that the new term is merely
a restatement of immoral purpose in a utilitarian key. Whatever South Dakota's
intentions may be, what is likely to be the Court's reaction to the application of
this statute to a couple who have consensual oral sex in their top-down
convertible on a warm July afternoon while cruising along Interstate 90? If the
statute is validly applied, is it because South Dakota's purpose is sufficiently
utilitarian, or is it because it is legitimate for South Dakota to promote the
public's sense of morality in this instance? If the answer is that the law is now
sufficiently utilitarian to be valid, what is the utile end sought to be
accomplished by punishing conduct that annoys, offends, or alarms others? Is
not deterrence of behavior that is likely to arouse such reactions grounded on
promotion of the majority's moral sensibilities? Or would the Court conclude
that the law may validly be applied because this involves public conduct?
If the Court were to conclude that promotion of morality is legitimate
when applied to public conduct, it would simply have transposed Chief Justice
Burger's couple from Times Square to the Dakota prairie. Such a move
requires an explanation of why morality is adequate when invoked to curb
conduct in public, but inadequate to punish the same conduct engaged in
privately. Surely the moral injury is much the same to those who find such
sexual conduct immoral; the difference must lie in the utilitarian concerns that
attend public conduct and, as noted above, those utile objectives seem to be
dubious.
If the Court were to conclude that the promotion of morality is illegitimate
only when it invades "the personal and private life of the individual, 1 43 it must
necessarily determine when such invasion has occurred. If it elides
confrontation with that issue by resort to the distinction between the
individual's private life and public conduct, it will simply have retreated into
utilitarian justifications. If the Court tackles the issue, it will be forced to
142. Id. § 22-24-1.2.
143. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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conclude either that morality alone can never justify invasion into personal
choices or to describe the conditions that validate morality-based incursions
into private and personal choices. The former outcome has been discussed; the
latter presents at least three possibilities.
First, the legitimacy of a moral justification may depend upon the purpose
for which it is invoked, 144 but, if so, the Court will have subscribed to the view
that moral claims lack universality. Some moral claims are better than others,
but a rejection of some moral positions and acceptance of others based on
expediency or simple preference not only lacks any objective foundation, it
requires some principle by which to justify the selection of preferred moral
claims. The criterion cannot be public sentiment or the Court in Lawrence
would have upheld Texas's statute. I do not condemn such a process; I claim
only that it is quite postmodern.
Second, the Court may decide that morality is always an inadequate
justification and sort private and personal actions into those that are
insufficiently private and those that are sufficiently personal and private to
withstand regulation. Postmodern thought contends that the distinction
between the public and private is illusory;145 thus, this choice is unlikely if the
Court is besotted with postmodemism. Nonetheless, in Lawrence the Court
drew a distinction between public and private conduct, and this even-more-
subtle distinction is not implausible. Some personal and private conduct may
not be sufficiently personal and private. This outcome involves considerable
sleight-of-hand shuffling of morality, utility, and the concepts of public and
private conduct. That would render doctrine in this area even more uncertain
and contingent than now, but unbounded contingency may be at the heart of the
post-Lawrence world and unbounded contingency is central to postmodern
thought.
The final possibility is that the Court would declare that the illegitimacy of
governmental promotion of morality is confined to the facts of Lawrence.
Were the Court to do so, it might be said that the Court simply made a moral
judgment: hounding gays and lesbians through criminal prosecution is immoral
and unjust. Of course, there would remain the problem of justifying the
Court's moral judgment as its source of constitutional law146 but putting that
144. See id. at 571-78 (declaring that the state could not criminalize private acts of same
sex sodomy).
145. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 103 (1987) (noting
that critical legal studies commentators find mainstream notions of a public/private distinction
to be meaningless because the public and private cannot be easily separated).
146. Ronald Dworkin is the leading advocate of this version of constitutional adjudication.
This is a debate into which I need not enter for purposes of this paper.
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aside, we would still be left with the problem of why that moral judgment did
not compel a conclusion that such protected intimacies are a constitutionally
fundamental right. Reading Lawrence as an exercise in moral judgment also
requires the Court to distinguish between those moral judgments that trump
democratic preferences and those that do not.147 If Lawrence was a moral
judgment it was an uncommonly tepid one, and if it was not a moral judgment
but simply a conclusion that public morality has no legitimate role to play in
these narrow circumstances, it is not clear why the promotion of public morality
is so narrowly illegitimate. At bottom, then, no matter how these post-
Lawrence possibilities are resolved, Lawrence leads to the conclusion that the
Court surely does not envision moral principles as absolute and unchanging.
Whether it is consciously celebrating a fragmented and chaotic moral
landscape, or merely accepting it as a reality, is harder to answer. No matter
which outcome results, the rationale employed necessarily is highly contingent,
provisional, subjective, and fragmented. Just as all roads once led to Rome, so
all the roads that head out from Lawrence seem to converge on the postmodem
city.
B. The Incoherence of Tiered Scrutiny
The recurring tropes of postmodernism are fragmentation, randomness,
contingency, and provisionality. Postmodernism celebrates these qualities;
modernism seeks their cure. In the rise and decline of tiered scrutiny, we can
see a distinct progression from modernism to postmodemism.
During the twentieth century, constitutional law confronted "the problem
of how to mediate the presumed validity of government action and the
presumptive primacy of individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution.', 48
The Court brought a modem sensibility to bear upon this issue and solved it by
inventing tiered scrutiny, which "was held together by the idea that courts could
detect which legislative or executive actions were presumptively void, and
subject them to searching inquiry with the burden of justification placed
squarely on the government."'' 49 The occasions for discharging that task
147. For example, Lawrence thus becomes a moral judgment that governments may not
prohibit private, adult, consensual sexual conduct between homosexual adults, but it is most
improbable that the Court would make a similar moral judgment to protect private, adult,
consensual use of tobacco products.
148. Massey, supra note 113, at 945.
149. Id.
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became more frequent as government exercised its regulatory power ever
more broadly. Thus, it is hardly surprising that:
[T]iered scrutiny assumed ever increasing complexity. Intermediate
scrutiny joined strict scrutiny and the default level, minimal scrutiny.
Debate ensued concerning whether courts should assess the
legislature's hypothetical purposes, stated purposes, or engage in a
judicial quest for its actual purposes. Rarefied discussion of the
relative importance of governmental objectives became a staple of
tiered scrutiny, as did fine distinctions concerning the closeness of
the fit between the challenged means and the government's
objectives. Inevitably, the discussion broadened to include the
appropriate method for locating those liberties deemed so
fundamental that their invasion by government ought to be treated as
presumptively unlawful. 50
That process was a quintessentially modem one. Method was imposed on
a fractious reality, in order to bring doctrinal and theoretical order out of
the apparent chaos of the multiple possibilities presented by the clash
between presumptively valid regulation and an expanding sense of
constitutionally protected liberties. But there may have been madness in
the method, for the apparatus of tiered scrutiny has become creakier,
possibly groaning from the stress of its own weight.
Tiered scrutiny assumed the existence of consistent and ready
markers to identify governmental acts that were so strongly presumed to
be void that they should be subject to strict scrutiny (call them "red
flags"), and other such markers to identify governmental acts that were
less strongly presumed to be void and thus subject to intermediate
scrutiny ("yellow flags"). Everything else got a "green flag," the
presumption of validity that could only be overcome by proof of either
the lack of any legitimate government interest or that the action was not
rationally related to the accomplishment of any legitimate purpose. As
the modern sensibility strived to refine this taxonomy, it experienced a bit
of color blindness. Some green flags began to assume ajaundiced hue,' 5'
and as those flags became ever more yellow some observers discerned a
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (voiding Idaho's automatic
preference for men as administrators of intestate estates as "arbitrary" and irrational); Jimenez v.
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628,632-37 (1974) (employing minimal scrutiny to conclude that stricter
eligibility requirements for illegitimate children to receive benefits as a result of their parent's
disability violates equal protection).
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very reddish tint to them,152 but in the end they settled into the yellow
band of the spectrum.'
53
Reliance on such markers was not sufficient to deal with the problems
tiered scrutiny purported to solve. Over time, the category of presumptively
valid regulations began to assume a kaleidoscopic quality. Some argued that a
government's legitimate purpose for acting should be located by reference to
the purposes stated by the legislature; others contended for the actual purposes
of the legislation, and even more asserted that any conceivable purpose,
however outlandish or hypothetical, would suffice. 54 These difficulties were
compounded by the propensity of the Court to shift from one source of
152. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (Brennan, J.) (plurality
opinion) (arguing that sex should constitute a suspect classification for equal protection
purposes, thus triggering strict scrutiny); cf Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 518-19 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens stated:
The Court recognizes "that the legal status of illegitimacy.., is, like race or
national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the
illegitimate individual [that] bears no relation to the individual's ability to
participate in and contribute to society... [and that] imposing disabilities on the
illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing".... It
seems rather plain to me that this premise demands a conclusion that the
classification is invalid unless it is justified by a weightier governmental interest
than merely "administrative convenience."
Id.
153. See Craig v. Borden, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (declaring that classifications based on
sex are presumptively violative of the Equal Protection Clause, but that the government may
justify such classifications by proving that they are substantially related to an important state
interest); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (noting that classifications based on
legitimacy are presumptively violative of the Equal Protection Clause but that they may be
justified by meeting the burden of intermediate scrutiny).
154. See United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,179 (1980) (arguing that where
there exist "plausible reasons" for legislative action, even if those reasons are not articulated
anywhere in the legislative record, the search for a conceivable, hypothetical purpose is at an
end); cf id. at 180-81 (Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice Brennan that simply
looking for a conceivable or plausible reason for legislative action is an insufficient standard of
judicial review and arguing for the requirement of"a correlation between the classification and
either the actual purpose of the statute or a legitimate purpose that we may reasonably presume
motivated an impartial legislature"); id. at 186 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the opinion
of the Court for declaring tautologically that the "'plain language of [the statute]' marks the
beginning and the end of our inquiry"). The import of Rehnquist's tautology was simply that if
plausible, conceivable (albeit hypothetical) purposes support a legislative classification, that
minimal scrutiny is satisfied. Justice Brennan argued that courts should start with the
legislatively stated purpose, not any conceivable purpose, and uphold classifications that
rationally further such purposes. Id. at 188. But when challenged classifications are "either
irrelevant to or counter to that purpose," Brennan contended that courts may uphold such
classifications only if they are "rationally related to achievement of an actual legitimate
governmental purpose." Id. at 188.
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identifying governmental purpose to another, and the lack of any general
principle for explaining when this shift should occur. Two classic examples are
United States Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno'5 and Romer v. Evans.1
56
In Moreno, the Court dismissed arguments that the statutory ban on receipt of
food stamps by households composed of unrelated persons was rationally
related to the purpose of minimizing fraud by declaring that the ban was
"clearly irrelevant to the stated purposes" of the food stamp program, which
Congress had said was to alleviate hunger and malnutrition and strengthen the
agricultural economy. 57 Because Congress's stated purpose was simply not
served by the prohibition, the Court then searched for Congress's actual
purpose-a purpose deduced from the legislative history to be "to prevent so-
called 'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from participating in the food stamp
program."' 58 That "actual" purpose, derived in part by reference to statutory
text and in part by sleuthing through the legislative history, was then declared
to be illegitimate: A "bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate government interest."159
In Romer, the Court voided a Colorado constitutional amendment that
barred any unit of Colorado government from recognizing sexual orientation as
a basis for asserting any "protected status or claim of discrimination."' 160 Its
method of doing so was first to declare that Colorado's hypothetical and
conceivable purposes-preservation of associational freedom and conservation
of scarce resources to combat more inimical forms of discrimination-were
incredible given the breadth of the disability Colorado imposed on
homosexuals-the loss "even of the protection of general laws and policies that
prohibit arbitrary discrimination" that might be based on sexual orientation. 1
61
Freed of the constraints of hypothetical and conceivable purposes, the Court
determined that the actual intent of the Colorado electorate was hostility toward
155. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 532-33 (1973) (declaring a provision
of the Food Stamp Act of 1964 denying benefits to households with unrelated persons to be in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause because there was no rational relationship between the
exclusion of unrelated persons from benefits and the prevention of fraud).
156. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,635 (1996) (declaring Amendment 2 to the Colorado
Constitution invalid under the Equal Protection Clause).
157. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 (quoting CoLo. CONST. art. II, amend. II, § 30b).
161. See id. at 630 (pointing out that the effect of Amendment 2 was to prevent any
assertion of a claim that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation might be arbitrary and,
thus, lawless, and that putting aside the question of whether and in what contexts such
discrimination might in fact be arbitrary).
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homosexuals-the desire to "deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.'
62
Unlike Moreno, the Court in Romer divined the actual intent of millions of
Colorado voters mostly by reasoning from the likely effect of the text of the
constitutional amendment.' 
63
Were that the only crenellation upon the battlement of minimal scrutiny,
the modernist project might be tenable. But it is not. If we were to extract a
general principle from Moreno and Romer, we might say that courts applying
minimal scrutiny should accept any conceivable hypothetical purpose as
legitimate except when either the regulation is irrelevant to its stated purpose or
serves all the conceivable purposes exceedingly poorly. However, that cannot
be correct because the Court does not adhere to any such principle. The
clearest indication is the old chestnut of Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New
York, 164 in which the Court upheld the validity of a New York City law,
supposedly enacted to enhance traffic safety, that barred common carriers from
advertising others' wares on its delivery vans while permitting thousands of
virtually identical delivery vans to advertise their owners' wares.165 IfRomer's
methodology governed, the Court would have concluded that the absurdly weak
connection between the city's conceivable purpose and the effect of the law
required a search for actual purpose. As we know, the Court did not do so; by
its famous declaration that "[i]t is no requirement of equal protection that all
evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all,"'166 it was content to allow
this ludicrous underinclusion to go unexamined.
Of course, Railway Express might state the general principle from which
Moreno and Romer were aberrational departures. But that would require an
explanation for City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 67 and Plyler
162. Id. at 635.
163. Perhaps it was because the Court reasoned that the probable effect of the provision
revealed the electorate's actual purpose that the Court did not wade into the murky waters of
explaining how one can detect the actual purpose of even a collective deliberative body, much
less a mass of voters. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (analyzing the difficulties attendant to ascertaining the actual purposes of a
legislature in enacting legislation).
164. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949) (deciding that,
despite being somewhat underinclusive, a New York City traffic regulation prohibiting certain
kinds of advertisements to be displayed on vehicles did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
165. Id.atllO-11.
166. Id. at ll0.
167. City ofClebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,446-47 (1985) (holding
that rational basis review applied to an ordinance requiring a special use permit for a home for
the mentally retarded but that the ordinance still violated the Equal Protection Clause under
rational basis review).
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v. Doe.168 In Cleburne, the Court ruled that the city of Clebume, Texas had
violated equal protection by its refusal to permit a group home for the mentally
retarded while allowing virtually every other type of group living facility. 69
Having rejected two of Clebume's asserted interests as illegitimate, 70 the Court
concluded that the city's prohibition was simply not rationally related to its
legitimate objectives of limiting the size and number of occupants of the home
and concern about its location within a flood plain.'17  This was so mostly
because of the wildly underinclusive nature of the city's refusal: no other
group living facility was subject to the same restrictions, a key fact that
undergirded the Court's conclusion that the city's refusal "appears to us to rest
on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded."'
72
Plyler might be explained as a departure from minimal scrutiny but, if so,
the problem becomes why the Court applied an enhanced brand of minimal
scrutiny and did not opt for either intermediate or strict scrutiny. Facially, the
answer is clear: Texas's refusal to provide a free public education to unlawful
resident children did not impinge on any recognized constitutionally
fundamental right nor did it involve a suspect (or even quasi-suspect)
classification. 173 But because "certain forms of legislative classification, while
not facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional
difficulties.., we have [inquired whether such classifications] may fairly be
viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the State."' 174 This move, coupled
with shifting the burden of proof to Texas, enhanced minimal scrutiny to the
point that it was something quite different; Texas simply could not prove that
its interests were sufficiently substantial or, more akin to Cleburne, that its ban
was adequately connected to its arguably substantial interests.
75
168. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that a statute prohibiting state funds
from being used to educate illegal immigrant children and denying such children access to
public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause).
169. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
170. See id. 473 U.S. at 448-50 (defining the two illegitimate objectives as unsupported
"negative attitudes" of nearby property owners and "vague, undifferentiated fears" that middle
school students would harass the retarded residents).
171. See id. at 449-50 (explaining that the statute at issue bore no rational connection to
the goals of reducing population concentrations in residences and preventing harm from
flooding as a result of the home being in a floodplain).
172. Id. at 450.
173. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220-21 (stating that education is not a fundamental right and
that classifications based upon legal status are not subject to enhanced scrutiny).
174. Id. at 217-18 (emphasis added).
175. See id. at 223-30 (declaring that the state must demonstrate a rational basis for
legislation and that the prohibition is "ludicrously ineffectual" to accomplishing the state's goal
of protecting "itself from an influx of illegal immigrants").
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This continual refinement of tiered scrutiny until it has lost coherence is
not limited to minimal scrutiny; a similar tale may be told of strict scrutiny in
equal protection cases. The origin of strict scrutiny with respect to racial
classifications (the paradigm case for strict scrutiny based on suspect
classifications) lies in the infamous case ofKorematsu v. UnitedStates.176 The
Court began by declaring that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights
of a single racial group are immediately suspect... [and] courts must subject
them to the most rigid scrutiny,"'177 adding that "[n]othing short of... the
gravest imminent danger to the public safety can constitutionally justify [the
exclusion]" of Japanese-ancestry Americans from their homes on the West
Coast.178 But having established the necessity of overcoming strict scrutiny, the
Court proceeded to exhibit extraordinary deference to government decision
makers: "'[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military
authorities and of Congress .... ,,179 The fact that the exclusion was "a
military imperative answers the contention that the exclusion was.., based on
antagonism to those of Japanese origin." 180 Because "the military authorities
considered that the need for action was great, and time was short ... [we]
cannot-by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight-now say
that at that time these actions were unjustified.' 81 Despite the result in
Korematsu, strict scrutiny for racial classifications remained and hardened to
the point that, by 1971, Gerald Gunther could declare that it was "strict in
theory and fatal in fact.' 82 It is no wonder that Korematsu is reviled1 3 and
Fred Korematsu's conviction was later vacated because the government
176. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (holding that an executive
order interning people of Japanese descent from the west coast in large camps was
constitutional). But see Neil Gotanda, The Story ofKorematsu: The Japanese-American Cases,
in CoNsTTurONAL LAW STORIES, 249, 271 (Michael Dorfed., 2003) (claiming that Korematsu
did not "apply heightened judicial review," much less strict scrutiny).
177. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
178. Id. at 218.
179. Id. (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943)).
180. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
181. Id. at223-24.
182. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. RFV. 1, 8
(1972) (describing the practical effect of a strict scrutiny regime biased toward the government).
183. But see William H. Rehnquist, ALL THE LAws BuT ONE: Civ LIBERTiS iN WARTImE,
207-11 (1998) (defending Korematsu); Pamela Karlan & Richard Posner, The Triumph of
Expedience: How America Lost the Election to the Courts, HARPER'S, May 2001, at 31, 37-39
(characterizing the Korematsu result as "defensible," in Posner's view, and "disastrous law," in
Karlan's view).
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misrepresented facts to the Court; 184 nevertheless, the Korematsu method lives
on, applied most recently in Grutter v. Bollinger. 1
85
In Grutter, the court applied strict scrutiny to the University of Michigan
Law School's race-based admission policies that sought to enroll a critical mass
of black, Hispanic, and indigenous Americans 186 but upheld the Law School's
policies by concluding that its use of race was narrowly tailored to advance the
Law School's compelling objective of "attaining a diverse student body." 187 To
do so, the Court deferred to the "Law School's educational judgment that such
diversity is essential to its educational mission" 188 and justified that deference
by "our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's academic
mission."'189 Indeed, so strong is that tradition and its correlative deference that
"'good faith' on the part of a university is 'presumed' absent 'a showing to the
contrary." 190 Scratch tweedy university administrators, substitute starched
khaki military officers, and you have Korematsu: "Congress repos[ed] its
confidence in this time of war in our military leaders-as inevitably it must-
[and] determined they should have the power to [incarcerate Americans of
Japanese ancestry]."'19 1 But, you say, we can't trust the military-the vacation
of Fred Korematsu's conviction because of military deceit proves that, to say
nothing of Vietnam-and we can trust academicians. Really? The former
admissions director of the University of Michigan Law School "testified that
faculty members were 'breathtakingly cynical' in deciding who would qualify
as underrepresented minorities. An example he offered was faculty debate as to
whether Cubans should be counted as Hispanics: one professor objected on the
184. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (vacating
the judgment); see also Peter Irons, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983) (compiling evidence of government
misconduct).
185. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343-44 (2003) (upholding the race-conscious
admissions policy of a state university law school on the basis of a compelling state interest-
diversity in the student body).
186. Id. at 326 ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment 'protect[s] persons, not groups"' (quoting
Adarand Constructors v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995))); Id. at 327 ("[AIIl governmental uses
of race are subject to strict scrutiny.").
187. Id. at 329.
188. Id. at 328.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 329 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 (1978)
(plurality opinion)).
191. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (emphasis added).
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grounds that Cubans were Republicans."' 192 As one of Walt Kelly's Pogo
characters might say, "'Nuff said."'
193
In this vignette we can see how modernism's determination to impose
order on a balky and fragmented world morphed over time into an unconscious
acceptance, even celebration, of that chaotic discontinuity. Strict scrutiny that
is fatal in fact is sometimes neither strict nor fatal. The presumption of
constitutional invalidity that is the fulcrum of strict scrutiny ordinarily demands
stem skepticism toward government justifications, but sometimes that
skepticism melts into compliant deference. Such deference may be merited, but
more likely it is not, as it surely turned out to not be merited in Korematsu.
Whether or not the Grutter and Korematsu brand of strict scrutiny is a good
idea, the larger point is that it embraces modernism's form but employs the
happy anomie of postmodernism as its engine of analysis.1 94 Nor is this
confined to strict scrutiny.
The green flag of minimal scrutiny sometimes turns yellow or red, and the
mechanism for the change is neither clear nor consistent. Sometimes it is
underinclusion, as in Cleburne,195 but sometimes underinclusion is not enough
to turn the hue, as in Railway Express. 96 Sometimes the legislature's actual
purpose, inferred from the measure's effects, is sufficient, as in Romer,19 7 but
sometimes actual purpose is inferred from legislative history or statutory
disconnection from the legislature's stated purpose, as in Moreno.198 Other
times, as in Plyler,199 it is simply the Court's gestalt, its sense of the presence of
192. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
193. See generally Walt Kelly, Poo (1951) (engaging hot-button political issues with
whimsical, ironic cartoons).
194. See Massey, supra note 113, at 945 (elaborating on the possible demise of the formal
structure of tiered scrutiny).
195. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text (describing cases striking down the
city of Cleburne's prohibition on a home for the mentally retarded because the city failed to
subject other institutional housing to the same restrictions).
196. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (describing how a court upheld a New
York City law which prohibited advertising on commercial vehicles only if the advertising did
not promote the vehicle owner's business).
197. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text (describing cases striking down an
amendment to the Colorado Constitution which disqualified homosexuals as a group from
legislative protection because the Court deduced hostility in the amendment's intent).
198. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text (explaining a case where labeling a
restriction on food-stamp provisions to households composed of unrelated persons was
irrelevant to the original purpose of the food-stamp program).
199. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text (describing how a court applied
seemingly heightened level of scrutiny to a Texas statute denying public education to unlawfully
resident children-a statute which did not explicitly impinge on a fundamental right or entail a
suspect classification).
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THE CONSTITUTION IN A POSTMODERN A GE
"recurring constitutional difficulties" that shifts the spectrum. The color of the
flag is uncertain, contingent, subjective, and a bit random.200 This is the
Court's postmodemism; it is postmodernist in its sensibility but does not know
that it is postmodernist. Unlike Kafka's Gregor Samsa, who at least realized
that he had turned into an insect, 20 1 the Court does not know that it has slipped
into postmodernism. But it has.
The idiosyncratic refinement of tiered scrutiny is not confined to equal
protection; a similar pattern emerges from the due process cases. Although
economic substantive due process was drummed out of the constitutional
pantheon, its cousin privacy, or personal autonomy, was permitted to stay.
Though decided in the era of economic substantive due process, Meyer v.
Nebraska20 2 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters2 °3 remained alive after the ghosts of
their economic kin had departed. To be sure, Griswold v. Connecticut 4
purported to rest its decision voiding Connecticut's prohibition of the use of
contraceptives as birth control devices on the shadowy emanations from various
provisions of the Bill of Rights that protect personal privacy, but that rationale
did not last. Eight years later, in Roe v. Wade,2 °5 the Court grounded the
200. For a metaphor for this process in the form of a children's story, see GERTRUDE
CRAMPTON, ToOTLE 1-24 (Little Golden Books, Simon & Schuster, 1945). The essence of the
tale is that Tootle, the dreamy little locomotive, has ignored the principal rule of little
locomotive school and jumped off the rails to wander through the grassy hills, smelling
buttercups and the like. Id. at 12. To correct this misbehavior, kindly old Bill the Engineer
enlisted the aid of dozens of villagers, all armed with red flags. Id. at 16-18. They hid behind
all sorts of likely spots off the rails and when Tootle appeared, gaily seeking new pastures, out
would pop a red flag, and Tootle would dutifully stop. Id. at 18-22. Frustrated to tears, Tootle
finally spotted Bill, energetically waving a green flag over the tracks. Id. at 22. Tootle hopped
back on the rails and gladly stayed there. Id. This is, of course, a modernist morality play, and
a rather obvious one at that. But if the flags were in the hands of the Supreme Court, they
would morph from green to yellow to red and back again without much reason for change.
Tootle would, if modernist, be crying its headlamps out or, if postmodernist, gleefully
celebrating the chaotic indeterminacy of the world. The Supreme flag waver would be
celebrating the indeterminacy.
201. See generally FRANZ KAFKA, THE METAMORPHOSIS (1916) (relating the allegorical
experience of a traveling salesman who wakes up one morning to find himself transformed into
a monstrous bug).
202. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (reversing the conviction of a
schoolteacher who, in violation of a Nebraska statute forbidding the teaching of foreign
languages, taught a ten year old how to read German).
203. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (striking down an Oregon
law compelling all children to attend public schools because of its unreasonable interference
with the rights of parents and private educators).
204. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (striking down a
Connecticut law which criminalized the use of contraception because it unjustifiably intruded on
the privacy rights of married couples).
205. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (recognizing a right to privacy which
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constellation of privacy or autonomy rights squarely in "the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty,, 20 6 and the Court then proceeded to
assimilate these rights into tiered scrutiny by declaring them to be
constitutionally fundamental, a characterization that triggered the presumption
of invalidity for any government action invading this protected sphere of
liberty.2 °7 As with equal protection, "regulation[s] limiting these rights may be
justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' and.., must be narrowly drawn
to express only the legitimate state interests at stake., 208 From that point on, the
modernist desire to create an orderly taxonomy began to produce ever more
refinements, resulting (as with equal protection) in the creation of a disorderly
taxonomy that now (as we shall see in a moment) has become just another
roadside attraction on the postmodern highway.20 9
The Court's first refinement was to hedge its bets on the question of what
constitutes a constitutionally fundamental right, the trigger to strict scrutiny.
Marriage is a good example. Loving v. Virginia210 recognized that marriage
was a "fundamental freedom, 21 1 and that racial barriers to marriage offended
equal protection. 21 2 In Zablocki v. Redhail,213 the Court confirmed that "the
right to marry is part of the fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,"214 but added that not "every
state regulation which relates in any way to the.., prerequisites for marriage
must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations
that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital
relationship may legitimately be imposed., 21 5 This makes sense, but of course
it undercuts the fundamental nature of the asserted right. Thus it should come
encompasses first trimester abortions).
206. Id.
207. See id. at 154 (incorporating the newly recognized privacy right into the doctrine of
fundamental rights).
208. Id. at 155 (internal citations omitted).
209. Apologies to TOM ROBBINS, ANOTHER ROADSIDE ATTRAcTON (1971), to whom I owe
this metaphor.
210. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (vacating, on equal protection and due
process grounds, the sentences of a couple convicted of violating Virginia's ban on interracial
marriages).
211. Id.
212. See id. at 11-12 (finding no compelling state interest to justify a prohibition contrary
to the central meaning of the Equal Protection clause).
213. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (striking down a Wisconsin statute
which prevents men obligated to pay child support from marrying without court approval).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 386.
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as no surprise that although the Court assumes the existence of a fundamental
right to die216 it has never actually so held and has rejected attempts to establish
a constitutionally fundamental right to enlist the aid of others in dying.
217
Nor should it have been much of a surprise that the Court scrapped all but
the facade of Roe v. Wade218 in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.219 Roe had treated abortion as a fundamental right and
its trimester framework was designed to acknowledge the point at which
various state interests became sufficiently compelling to overcome strict
scrutiny. Casey, however, junked that analysis, preferring instead to rely upon
two quite different standards to assess the validity of abortion restrictions
imposed either before or after viability.220 Restrictions imposed before fetal
viability are valid if they do not impose an "undue burden" 221 on a woman's
right to abort, and a burden is undue if it "has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus., 222 Post-viability abortions may be banned "except where it is necessary,
in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother., 223 Strict scrutiny disappeared in the Court's adherence "to the essence
of Roe's original decision,, 224 and, if strict scrutiny disappeared, so did the
constitutionally fundamental liberty interest that triggers strict scrutiny. But the
abortion right did not disappear; it acquired a unique, judicially tailored suit
designed to fit the right just perfectly, even if it is now a smidgen less
fundamental. Casey is politically pragmatic even if it has not ushered in the
"pax Roeana" that Justice Scalia ridiculed.225 When taken together with the
other shards of contemporary substantive due process, Casey employs a method
216. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Miss. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) ("[W]e
assume that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.").
217. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997) (upholding the validity of
Washington's prohibition of assisted suicide as applied to terminally ill competent adults who
wish to hasten their death by physician-prescribed medications).
218. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (recognizing a right to privacy which
encompasses first trimester abortions).
219. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992) (replacing
Roe's trimester framework with the undue burden test but reaffirming the essential holding that
women have a right to an abortion prior to fetal viability).
220. See id. at 872-78 (outlining the standards by which the central holding of Roe will be
preserved while explaining the courts reasons for rejecting a "rigid trimester framework").
221. Id. at 876.
222. Id. at 877.
223. Id. at 879.
224. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
225. Id. at 996 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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that skirts the divide between pragmatism and postmodernism, if there is indeed
any identifiable frontier between the two.
The Court's other major refinement was to blur the significance of
characterizing a claimed liberty as constitutionally fundamental. Moore v. City
of East Cleveland 26 is a fine example. Although the Court struck down the
city's zoning ordinance that prevented Mrs. Moore from living with her two
grandsons (cousins, not brothers) and delivered a majestic ode to the extended
family, 227 it did not hold that the right to live with extended family is a
constitutionally fundamental right.228 Rather, the Court characterized "family
life [as] one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause, ' 229 and noted
that "when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living
arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance of the
governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the
challenged regulation.2 30 The Court then proceeded to characterize the city's
goals as "legitimate" but concluded that the zoning ordinance "serve[d] them
marginally, at best.
23'
With Moore as background, it is far more understandable why the Court in
Casey jettisoned the fundamental nature of the abortion right and substituted
for strict scrutiny a wholly unrelated standard of review. At least Casey
announced the standard; Moore left us guessing. If Moore was a broad hint
that non-fundamental liberties might still fail minimal scrutiny, Lawrence
certainly confirmed the point. The Court might have treated as fundamental the
right to engage "in intimate [consensual, private sexual] conduct with another
person [as] but one element in personal bond that is more enduring, 2 32 but it
did not. Instead, it treated this liberty interest as a garden-variety non-
fundamental liberty interest, more or less the same as the right to smoke cigars
226. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (striking down, on
due process grounds, an Ohio housing ordinance which limited those persons who could live in
a single dwelling according to a narrow definition of what constitutes a family).
227. See id. at 504-05 ("The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable
and equally deserving of constitutional recognition [as those of the nuclear family].").
228. See id. at 500-01 ("[Ulnless we close our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights
associated with the family have been accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, we cannot avoid applying the force and rationale of [precedents which engage
fundamental rights] to the family choice involved in this case.").
229. Id. at 499.
230. Id.
231. Moore, 431 U.S. at 500.
232. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
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or to eat meat.233 If the liberty protected in Lawrence really is fundamental,
despite the Court's denial, it is an uncommonly narrow fundamental liberty, for
the Court fenced it in with numerous instances in which it would not apply. If
it is not fundamental, as the Court contends, it is exceedingly difficult to detect
why regulation of this ordinary liberty failed minimal scrutiny and regulation of
meat-eaters and cigar-smokers would almost certainly survive that level of
review. The obvious response is that the right to engage in private, consensual
intimate sexual relations with your life partner is a lot more important than
cigar smoking. Perhaps; but if so, why did the court in Lawrence fail to
acknowledge that fact by declaring the right to be fundamental? The fact that it
did not do so injected tremendous instability into the application of tiered
scrutiny to substantive due process claims. As with Casey, Lawrence might be
a pragmatic judgment, but even more than Casey, Lawrence veers deeply into
the postmodern sensibility. Tiered review in modem substantive due process is
extraordinarily contingent on facts, highly subjective in its application, even a
bit random as to the triggering devices for heightened scrutiny. This is the
postmodem sensibility: "[L]et'sjust play with nonsense. ',234 Although I do not
contend that the Court is conscious of its postmodem sensibility, in the sense
that it openly celebrates indeterminacy and chaos, I do think that the Court is
trapped in a postmodem world. It sees the indeterminacy, but it cannot impose
the modem sensibility of bringing order out of chaos because it senses that such
a move will not work. Without being fully conscious of the implications of its
actions, the Court shifts into a postmodem mode while clinging to the form of
the modem.
C. Gonzales v. Raich and the Commodification of Everything
In Gonzales v. Raich,235 the Court upheld the validity of the Controlled
Substances Act236 as applied to prohibit the purely intrastate cultivation,
distribution, and possession of marijuana for medical purposes, an activity
233. See id. ("The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not
entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being
punished as criminals.").
234. Klages, supra note 17.
235. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (denying the substantive due process
and federalism claims of an intrastate grower of medical marijuana convicted of violating the
Controlled Substances Act).
236. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-24 (2000) (creating a classification hierarchy for pharmaceuticals,
illicit narcotics, plant matter, etc. and restricting or prohibiting the manufacture, distribution,
possession, and use of such substances).
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permitted by twelve states.237 In finding that the commerce power authorized
Congress to ban traffic in medical marijuana, the Court relied on its conclusion
that the banned activity was "quintessentially economic ' 238 and thus
distinguishable from the statutes struck down in United States v. Lope 239 and
United States v. Morrison.24° Of interest here is the Court's conception of
economic activity: Economics, said the Court, "refers to 'the production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities.' 20 41 Because the Controlled
Substances Act "regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market,"
it followed that local traffic in medical marijuana was an economic activity and,
thus, according to Wickard v. Filburn,242 could be regulated as an activity
exerting a substantial effect on interstate commerce. However, as Justice
Thomas noted in dissent, there are other ways to define the term economic,
such as that which relates "'to the production, development, and management
237. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.71.090, 17.37.010-17.37.080 (Lexis 2004) (permitting
physicians to prescribe marijuana for medical purposes); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ § 11362.5-9 (West 2005) (same); COLO. CONST., ART. XVIII, § 14, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-18-
406.3 (2004) (same); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 329-121-329-128 (2004 Cum. Supp.) (same); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN., Tit. 22, § 2383-B(5) (2004) (same); MONT. CODEANN. §§ 50-46-101-50-46-
210 (2004) (same); NEV. CONST., Art. 4, § 38, NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 453A.010-453A.810 (2003)
(same); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475.300-475.346 (2003) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 21-28.6-1-21-
28.6-11 (2006) (same); VT. STAT. ANN., Tit. 18, §§ 4472-4474(d) (Supp. 2004) (same); WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 69.51.010-69.51.080 (2004) (same); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3412.01 (Supp. 2004) (permitting physicians to prescribe Schedule I substances for medical
purposes). This voter initiative was purportedly repealed in 1997, but the repeal was rejected by
voters in 1998.
238. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005).
239. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act has nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic enterprise,
regardless of how broadly defined).
240. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) (stating that gender-
motivated violent crimes are not economic activity and striking down the Violence Against
Women Act). The Court in Raich also relied on the fact that both Lopez and Morrison involved
facial challenges to the statutes in question, while Raich raised an as-applied challenge:
Here, respondents ask us to excise individual applications of a concededly valid
statutory scheme. In contrast, in both Lopez and Morrison, the parties asserted that
a particular statute or provision fell outside Congress's commerce power in its
entirety. This distinction is pivotal for we have often reiterated that "[w]here the
class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the
courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class."
Raich, 545 U.S. at 3 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)).
241. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25 (quoting WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
720 (1966)).
242. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that activity, even if it is
local, may be regulated if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce).
THE CONSTITUTION IN A POSTMODERN A GE
of material wealth.' ,,243 Although Justice Thomas noted that the majority did
not explain why it selected a "remarkably expansive" 244 definition, he hinted
that the majority selected it "[t]o evade even [a] modest restriction on Federal
power.
245
The conclusion in Raich that the commerce power extends to "economic"
activity, defined as the possession of anything that has potential exchange
246value, represents an embrace of the notion that just about anything may be
"commodified." The trend toward commodification is itself a result of the
tendency to see no boundaries between a sphere of commerce-bargained-for
exchange-and a sphere of gratuity and altruism-the world of love and
247compassion. This, of course, is a central characteristic of the postmodern
243. Raich, 545 U.S. at 69 n.7 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 583 (3d ed. 1992)) (emphasis by Justice Thomas).
244. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 69 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
246. For example, see the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, which supplies a definition
of commodity as something "that is subject to ready exchange or exploitation within a market."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/commodity (last
visited Oct. 22, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 372 (4th ed. 2000) (defining
commodity as "something useful that can be turned to commercial or other advantage");
WEBSTER'S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 286 (1913) (defining commodity as "that which
affords convenience, advantage, or profit, especially in commerce, including everything
movable that is bought and sold"); COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://www.askoxford.com/conciseoed/commodityview=uk (last visited Oct. 22, 2006)
(defining commodity as "a raw material or agricultural product that can be bought and sold [or]
something useful or valuable") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key~commodity
* I +0&dict=A (last visited Oct. 22, 2006) (defining commodity as "anything that can be bought
and sold") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); WEBSTER'S 1828 DICTIONARY,
http://65.66.134.201/cgi-bin/webster/webster.exe?search-for-textswebl828 =commodity (last
visited Oct. 22, 2006) (defining commodity as "that which affords ease, convenience or
advantage; any thing that is useful, but particularly in commerce, including every thing movable
that is bought and sold") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); MSN ENCARTA
WORLD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, NORTH AMERICAN EDITION, http://encarta.
msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid= 1861598957 (last visited Oct.
22, 2006) (defining commodity as "an item that is bought and sold, [or] something that people
value or find useful") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commodity (last visited Oct. 22, 2006) (defining commodity) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Wikipedia states:
The word commodity is a term with distinct meanings in business and in Marxian
political economy. For the former, it is a largely homogenous product, whereas for
the latter, it refers generically to wares offered for exchange[;] a commodity is
simply any good or service offered as a product for sale on the market.
Id.
247. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (stating that in the postmodem era, all
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world, a world in which every facet of existence is relentlessly commodified.248
Postmodernism claims that the distinction between public and private is
illusory; in Raich, the Court adopted the close cousin of this contention. The
Court was not self-consciously postmodern but its mode of reasoning reflected
the increasingly postmodern sensibility of the culture of which it is a part.
Although it is not earthshaking to regard marijuana trafficking, whether for the
purpose of alleviating pain or altering consciousness, as economic activity, 49 in
the postmodern world the Court's embrace of commodification as the sine qua
non of economic activity opens the door to regulation of absolutely anything.
Consider the following exchanges between counsel and the Court in
Raich. Professor Randy Barnett, arguing for respondents Raich and Monson,
stated that "[t]he government claims [that locally grown and consumed medical
marijuana is] economic, we claim it's non-economic. ''250 Justice Kennedy
responded "that regular household chores... performed in an earlier time
mostly by women [were] classically economic-washing dishes, making bread.
And now you say growing marijuana isn't?, 251 Professor Barnett replied: "If
you accept the government's definition of economic then every-then washing
dishes, today, would be economic ....252  But the Court did accept the
government's premise, with the implication that everything from washing
dishes to chalking hopscotch patterns on your driveway-in short, everything
that can be commodified, which is everything-can be regulated under the
commerce power.
Further proof of this can be glimpsed from the Court's reaction to
Barnett's assertion that economic activity depends on:
[T]he nature of the activity involved, not necessarily its effect .... [F]or
example, prostitution is an economic activity. Marital relations is not an
human relationships are reduced to their exchange or consumption value).
248. See generally FREDERIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE
CAPIrrALIsM (1991) (arguing that a major effect ofpostmodernism is that culture, including our
history, has become a collection of empty styles or pastiches, which are then consumed as
commodities). More specifically, Jameson quotes liberally from GARY BECKER, AN ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO HuMAN BEHAVIOR (1976), in which Becker asserts that all human behavior can be
reduced to economic terms-utility maximization-and Jameson adds that Becker's model is
descriptively "impeccable" and "postmodem in its structure." JAMESON, at 269.
249. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 21 n.31 (2005) (estimating "that in 2000
American users spent $10.5 billion on the purchase of marijuana").
250. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-
1454), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument-transcripts/03-
1454.pdf.
251. Id. at 34.
252. Id.
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economic activity.... We could be talking about virtually the same act....
[We] don't say that because there is a market for prostitution, that,
therefore, everything that is not in that market [but which is a substitute] is
economic.253
Although no justice responded directly to this point, the Court rejected it as an
apt analogue to the activity at issue in Raich. Of course, after Raich Congress
might have commerce-based power to regulate marital sexual relations, but it
would surely be stripped of the ability to exercise that power by the rights-
bearing constitutional trump card of substantive due process. Even so, the
topsy-turvy nature of due process renders this a prediction of the result which
would probably be reached by a Court with a postmodem sensibility, rather
than an extrapolation from modernist doctrinal precepts.254
The steady cultural march toward the commodification of everything may
or may not be matched by a relentless extension of federal regulation to
activities newly commodified, but congressional failure to do so will not be the
product of constitutional roadblocks erected by the Court. Some commentators
think that Raich signals the end of meaningful judicial review of the scope of
the commerce power;255 others argue that Raich limits but does not foreclose
such judicial oversight;256 still others contend that Lopez and Morrison were
never all that significant and that the only meaningful judicially-imposed limits
on the commerce power would derive from the commerce clause's text, history
253. Id. at 49.
254. Of course one can reason to the same end by employing doctrinal arguments, but as
should be clear by now, I think the doctrine in this area--erected upon modernist precepts of
rational analysis and description-is no longer the product of rational analysis, if it ever was,
but reflects the postmodern contention that the postmodern world is characterized by "a
reshuffling of canonical feelings and values" and creation of a new "'structure of feeling'" that
involves "reworking and rewriting of an older system.... [T]his prodigious rewriting
operation... has the additional result... that everything is grist for its mill." JAMESON, supra
note 248, at xiv.
255. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law)
Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 751, 762-63 (2005) (arguing that Raich "hollow[s] out the
core" of Morrison); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, What Hath Raich Wrought?
Five Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 915, 933 (2005) (discussing the possibility that Raich
signals a return to the days when the Bill of Rights was the only judicially-enforced limit on the
federal government); cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for
Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 823, 838-51 (2005) (contending that Lopez
was a mistake and that the commerce power should be controlled by clear statement rules rather
than prohibitory rules).
256. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 743, 744-50
(2005) (discussing ways that future courts can limit Raich and preserve aspects of Lopez and
Morrison).
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and early precedent.257 Perhaps it was inevitable that the slender twigs of Lopez
and Morrison would wither early, for the cultural climate of never-ceasing
commodification is hardly one that can be expected to provide much
nourishment to a plant that is rooted in at least the possibility of a firm
distinction between commerce and a world in which mercenary values do not
really exist, much less predominate. In the postmodem world, though, that
distinction is chimerical, even risible.
D. Totaling Up the Circumstances
The last half of the twentieth century showed a persistent and increasing
trend toward the use of some version of the "totality of the circumstances" test
for constitutional validity. The resort to catch-all tests that make validity turn
upon the totality of the circumstances is little more than a de facto recognition
of hopeless indeterminacy, a dominant characteristic of postmodem thought.
Of course, the Court does not say that it resorts to the totality of the
circumstances because it is confronted with such indeterminacy; rather, it offers
up a variety of doctrinal, practical, or historical reasons to do so.
The phrase is most prominently associated with determining reasonable
suspicion sufficient to merit a stop-and-frisk search under the principles
articulated in Terry v. Ohio,258 but the essence of the "totality" approach can be
found in a variety of other contexts. The totality approach pervades much of
the law of separation of powers, including such specific matters as interbranch
appointment of inferior federal officers,259 limits on the President's power to
remove executive officials, 260 and the non-delegation doctrine. 261 Indeed,
separation of powers law is characterized by the Court's oscillation between
257. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marjfuana Case: A Commerce Clause
Counter-Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 879, 909-13 (2005) (arguing that the Court
should apply precise legal rules drawn from the Constitution rather than flexible standards
created by case-by-case adjudication).
258. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (stating that a police search must be
justified at the outset and must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances).
259. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 675-76 (1988) (stating that inter-branch
appointment of inferior officers is invalid if the "appointment [has] the potential to impair the
constitutional functions assigned to one of the branches" or if there exists "some 'incongruity'
between the functions normally performed by the [appointing branch] and the performance of
their duty to appoint").
260. See, e.g., id. at 691 (stating that "the real question is whether the removal restrictions
are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty").
261. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,412 (1989) (upholding the validity
of mandatory sentencing guidelines created by the Sentencing Commission).
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application of specific textual provisions 262 and general, thematic principles. 263
This oscillation is itself dependent upon the totality of the circumstances
confronting the Court when it reaches into its quiver for the arrow of decision.
A similar phenomenon may be observed in the law of regulatory takings, where
a multi-factor balancing test that the Court admits is an ad hoc approach 264 vies
with three categorical rules265 to determine when a regulation is a taking.
Crafting doctrine to respond to the circumstances presented for decision is
hardly noteworthy; what is noteworthy is the nature of the doctrine being
crafted as the Court's function has gradually shifted from case-by-case error
correction, "the patient, incremental method of the common law,"266 to a model
that is "basically legislative., 267 Because the common law method provides
"very limited guidance to lower courts ... the Court tries to use the few cases it
agrees to hear as occasions for laying down rules or standards that will control a
large number of future cases and thus allow the Court to turn its attention
elsewhere. 2 68 When the Court combines a move to a more overtly legislative
model of judging with an embrace of the totality of the circumstances as its
doctrinal standard, there are several possible results. First, the Court may
effectively cede to other actors the power to decide constitutional limits.
269
262. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983) (relying on the requirements of
bicameral action and presentment to the President to invalidate the one-house veto); Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) (relying on the same requirements to invalidate the
line item veto).
263. See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693 (upholding the Ethics in Government Act of 1978
because it did not "unduly interfer[e] with the Executive Branch"); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 382
(upholding the validity of the Sentencing Commission because it neither constituted
"encroachment" upon the powers of other branches nor "aggrandizement" of any single branch).
264. See Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (stating that
review of local zoning restrictions is essentially ad hoc and fact specific).
265. See Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992) (discussing the
categorical rules that (1) permanent physical dispossession is a taking; (2) loss of all
economically viable use is a taking, except when; (3) the regulation does no more than abate
what would be a nuisance under preexisting, background principles of local law, in which case
the regulation is not a taking).
266. Posner, supra note 101, at 35.
267. Id. at 37.
268. Id. The wisdom of this move is not of immediate interest to me; I am more interested
in its effects.
269. The result of the totality of the circumstances approach with respect to Terry searches
has been to dramatically increase the deference paid to police judgment. In separation of
powers, it has increased deference to Congress and, to a lesser extent, the President. In
regulatory takings, despite the rear-guard actions fought by those who desire categorical rules to
govern, the ad hoc totality of the circumstances approach has increased deference to
governmental regulators.
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Second, to the extent the Court retains this power, its exercise is far more likely
to be specific to the situation and far less likely to be predictable.2 70 These
results are not mutually exclusive. When combined, they increase the level of
fragmentation and potential incoherence that may be injected into constitutional
discourse. We might expect this from a postmodern constitutional discourse.
E. The Religion Clauses: Embracing Legislative Primacy Anew
From the nation's beginning until the mid-twentieth century, the Court
permitted legislatures to decide how much or little they wished to accommodate
religion. This practice, which I have elsewhere termed legislative primacy,
271
was produced by cultural and political forces. Culturally, it was due to the de
facto Protestant establishment that dominated America from 1833, when
Massachusetts became the last state to disestablish religion, until roughly the
end of World War II. Politically, it was as much the product of fear and
loathing of Roman Catholicism as it was recognition of the de facto Protestant
establishment. Thus, the Court stripped the free exercise guarantee of much
force in Reynolds v. United States272 and failed to do anything to enforce the
establishment clause.273
270. This is not altogether new. In 1944, Justice Owen Roberts complained that the
Court's decision was akin to "a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only."
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting). Nor was Justice Roberts
alone; the fluidity with which the Court was altering the pre-1937 constitutional order led one
commentator of that day to complain that it was all guesswork. See Frank W. Grinnell, The New
Guesspotism, 30 A.B.A. J. 507, 509 (1944) (arguing that recent judicial decisions were
undermining the stability of the law). In 1982, Chief Justice Burger griped that "by patching
together bits and pieces" of dubious doctrine "the Court spins out a theory custom-tailored to
the facts." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 244 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
271. See Calvin Massey, The Political Marketplace of Religion, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5
(2005) (elaborating on the Court's oscillation between judicial primacy and legislative primacy
in the religion clauses). Many of the ideas in this section are distilled from that article.
272. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878) (holding that free exercise
was not offended by generally applicable laws that prohibit religious conduct).
273. The Blaine Amendment, proposed in 1875 but which failed to gain the two-thirds
majority needed to submit it to the states, would have made the religion clauses of the First
Amendment applicable to the states and barred government school aid to religion. See 4 CONG.
REc. 205 (1875) (proposing to amend the Constitution to prevent state money from being placed
"under the control of any religious sect"). A host of"little Blaine" amendments were adopted by
states, and although they constituted the principal establishment clause bulwark of the era, their
operation was distinctly asymmetrical. Though facially neutral, their purpose was to prevent
state aid to Catholic schools and they did nothing to stop the commonplace practice of King
James Bible readings and prayer in the public schools.
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By the middle of the twentieth century this de facto Protestant
establishment collapsed. In its wake a new coalition of religious and secular
allies began to press for more stringent separation of government and religion.
From a cultural perspective, this represented the belated triumph of modernity.
A foundational principle of Enlightenment modernity was that rational inquiry
would result in the discovery of truth as opposed to the medieval commitment
to religious faith as the path to truth. Modernity thus posed a direct conflict
between rationality and faith, a conflict that produced one of two responses by
religion. The first, characteristic of mainstream Christian denominations, was
to turn religion into a vehicle for explaining what rational inquiry could not-
producing a God that was the "God of the gaps" in that inquiry. The second
response, characteristic of fundamentalist Christians, was to retreat to the
shadows of modem society, quietly practicing their faith and fighting rear-
guard actions against modernity. Though it is puzzling why it took so long for
modernity to influence the Court's doctrine of the religion clauses, the most
plausible answer is that cognitive dissonance enabled modernity and the
hegemony of cultural Protestantism to co-exist. This contradiction was stable
only because American elites were overwhelmingly Protestant, and, for
practical reasons, the growing Catholic presence contented itself with keeping
its faith largely out of the public realm. But this was not viable after decades of
massive immigration of Catholics and Jews, two world wars, a world-wide
economic depression, and the raw scars of religious hatred in the form of Nazi
genocide. Religious hegemony was exposed as inconsistent with modernity's
values.
The belated ascendance of modernity produced a doctrine of judicial
primacy in interpreting the religion clauses. Under this approach the Court
vigorously enforced each of the establishment and free exercise clauses,
restricting legislatures' discretion to accommodate religion. Everson v. Board
of Education274 ushered in the trope of a wall of separation of church and state,
but it was not until the public school prayer and Bible reading cases275 that the
establishment clause bricks and mortar began to be laid up. Sherbert v.
Verner276 did the same for the free exercise portion of the wall of separation.
274. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947) (holding that the First
Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its relations with religious groups and to neither
favor nor disfavor them).
275. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-36 (1962) (invalidating a state policy
recommending that a prayer be recited in public schools each day); Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,225-27 (1963) (invalidating a Pennsylvania law which required each
school day to begin with a reading from the Bible).
276. See Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398,409-10 (1963) (invalidating the application of
a South Carolina law which prohibited state unemployment aid to a woman discharged for
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By 1971 the three-part Lemon test 277 became the universal tool for divining
forbidden religious establishments.
Modernity's ascendance produced judicial primacy because modernity
placed a high value on tolerance and separation. On one hand, government and
religion had to be cabined into separate compartments because they offered
competing accounts of truth. Should government intrude upon religion, there
was a danger that modernity would dictate its truth to the faithful. Should
religion seize government there was a danger that religion would impose its
truth on the rational secularists who eschewed answers bottomed on religious
faith. From this perspective came the Court's view, expressed in Engel v.
Vitale, "that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government
and to degrade religion." 278 On the other hand, modernity's tolerance value
demanded accommodation of religious minorities, a principle underscored by
the revealed horrors of the Third Reich. Moreover, religious pluralism
embodied by accommodation of minority religions posed no real danger to
modemity's concern about keeping religion and government in separate
spheres. There just were not enough Jehovah's Witnesses, Quakers, or
Seventh-Day Adventists to capture the machinery of government. Thus did
American modernity squeeze out of the constitutional system much room for
legislative discretion to accommodate or burden religion, producing judicial
primacy in mediating the inherent conflict between the two religion clauses.
The irony of this development, however, is that modernity's triumph came
just as modernity was beginning to be overtaken by a postmodern
consciousness. Although modernity had posed a conflict between two
competing explanations of truth, postmodernism posits that no account can be
known to be universally true. The paradoxical result is that postmodemism
freed religion from the margins to which modernity had consigned it. As
modernity matured, the number of adherents to mainline denominations
declined. After all, the God-of-the-gaps of the mainline denominations
answered less and less as modernity's rationality narrowed the gaps in which he
operated, thus making him increasingly less relevant. Moreover, most of the
mainline adherents were likely modernist in their sensibilities and a gradual
disenchantment with God, in any form, was a predictable result. On the other
hand, the decline of modernity and rise of postmodemism opened "space for
failure to work on Saturday due to her religious beliefs).
277. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (holding that, to be valid, a
law must have a secular purpose, a "primary effect" that "neither advances nor inhibits religion,"
and must not foster an "excessive entanglement" between religion and government).
278. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431.
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radical religious pluralism by denying the possibility of meta-narratives. 27 9
Evangelical Christians stepped out of the shadows in which they had lurked in
modernity's reign and into this vacated space. The irony of postmodernism is
that it freed the medieval account to return, in the form of fundamentalism of
all kinds-any brand of religion that offers a single, universal, exclusive, and
infallible account of existence. A postmodernist can choose which account he
wishes to accept, but he cannot say that his chosen account is correct, in the
sense of being universally true. Thus, the fundamentalist account of existence,
even if rejected, cannot be labeled false by a postmodernist.
Moreover, much of traditional religion has been replaced by a distinctively
postmodern spirituality, a preoccupation with self-understanding that borrows
eclectically from many ways of apprehending transcendent reality, both
religious and secular. Although fundamentalist religions insist that man's task
is to understand and conform to God's will, postmodem spirituality sees man's
task to be understanding oneself and finding enlightenment through a voyage of
self-discovery. Because each such voyage is unique, the resulting religious
pluralism has increased the pressure upon political actors to accommodate a
vast variety of religions and, simultaneously, made imperative the need to avoid
compelling governments to accommodate the limitless variety of conduct that
may be the product of religious belief.
At the same time that the metaphysical landscape began to change, a
fundamental political realignment occurred. Until the last quarter of the
twentieth century, Protestants insisted on separation of church and state out of
fear of creeping Catholicism in the public square. But now, while mainline
Protestants continue to be separationist, evangelical Christians are considerably
more accommodationist. This shift occurred because evangelicals have been
gaining market share at the expense of the mainline churches, and evangelicals
have formed a common cause with other sects in supporting aid to religious
schools.28°
The doctrinal result was the return of legislative primacy. Employment
Division v. Smith281 painted Sherber ?82 into a comer and essentially revived
279. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Spirituality, Fundamentalism, Liberty: Religion at the End
of Modernity, 54 DEPAUL L. REv. 1197, 1207 (2005).
280. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MIcH. L. REv. 279, 327-28 (2001) (describing the change in attitude among
various Protestant sects toward funding religious schools); Massey, supra note 271, at 17-18
(arguing that post-modernist views have led to a rise in the number of evangelical adherents).
281. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that the Free
Exercise Clause did not prohibit the application of Oregon drug laws to the ceremonial
ingestion of peyote).
282. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,409-10 (1963) (invalidating the application of
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Reynolds,8 3 leaving accommodation in the name of free exercise largely up to
legislative discretion. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,284 the school voucher case, is
perhaps the best example of the relaxation of the zone of accommodations
forbidden by the establishment clause, but it is not alone.285 Although there are
some contrary indications,286 in the main, the well-developed trend is toward
legislative primacy. Locke v. Davey2 87 provides a thumbnail summation. In
upholding Washington's ban on state aid for "religious worship, exercise or
instruction,"288 as applied to Washington's refusal to permit public scholarships
to be used for theological instruction, the Court admitted that the ban was not
"facially neutral with respect to religion, "289 but upheld it because it was not the
product of "hostility toward religion. 2 90 Washington was free to decide how
a South Carolina law which prohibited state unemployment aid to a woman discharged for
failure to work on Saturday due to her religious beliefs).
283. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-67 (1878) (holding that the free
exercise is not offended by generally applicable laws that prohibit religious conduct).
284. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,652-63 (2002) (5-4 decision) (holding
that the voucher portion of an Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program did not violate the Establishment
Clause even though the majority of participating students had enrolled in religiously affiliated
schools).
285. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,726 (2005) (holding that a section of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, increasing the level of protection of
prisoners' and other incarcerated persons' religious rights, did not violate the Establishment
Clause); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854,2863-64 (2005) (5-4 decision) (holding that the
display of a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments on the grounds of the Texas
State Capitol did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment); Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835-36 (2000) (holding that legislation under which the federal
government distributes funds to state and local governmental agencies, which in turn lend
educational materials and equipment to public and private schools, does not violate the
Establishment Clause); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233-35 (1997) (5-4 decision)
(holding that a federally funded program providing supplemental, remedial instruction to
disadvantaged children on a neutral basis was not invalid under the Establishment Clause);
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993) (holding that the Establishment
Clause does not lay down an absolute barrier to the placement of a public employee in sectarian
schools).
286. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2745 (2005)
(holding that a county's posting of the Ten Commandments at its courthouses, with the purpose
of emphasizing and celebrating the Commandments' religious message, violates the
Establishment Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590-99 (1992) (5-4 decision) (holding
that the Establishment Clause forbids the inclusion of clergy who offer prayer as part of an
official public school graduation ceremony).
287. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (holding that the state of Washington
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause by refusing to fund devotional theology instruction).
288. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 (banning state aid for religious worship, exercise, or
instruction).
289. Locke, 540 U.S. at 720.
290. See id. at 721 (stating that the fact that a state would deal differently with education
THE CONSTITUTION IN A POSTMODERN A GE
much or little to accommodate religion. This discretion is what the Court
characterized as the considerable "play in the joints" between the religion
clauses.
291
Of course, this discretion is not unbounded. The judicially imposed
limits-those that mark the outer boundary of legislative discretion--consist
primarily of neutrality and equality.292 Governments must not favor one
religion over another, but neither may governments disfavor religion.293 These
principles suggest that it is not a forbidden establishment for government to
assist religious institutions in achieving secular objectives. Thus, in Zelman,
Ohio's secular objective was to provide school choice to improve the dismal
educational prospects of Cleveland's schoolchildren, and the establishment
clause was no barrier to inclusion of Catholic schools as one of the choices.294
The second coming of legislative primacy in religion clause jurisprudence
owes its arrival to the advent of postmodernism. Although the Court has surely
not so acted because it is self-consciously postmodem, its shift in doctrine may
just as surely be traced to a variety of cultural and political phenomena that are
rooted in the developing postmodern cultural consciousness. Moreover,
because legislative primacy leaves so much room for legislative discretion to
accommodate religion, it will likely invite significantly greater religious rent-
seeking, in the form of either positive benefits to religion or facially neutral
burdens imposed on rival rent-seekers. That phenomenon, in turn, will likely
result in greater tension and animosity between sects and between religious and
secular elements of the polity. The contingency and fragmentation of
experience that postmodern thought posits will become ever more characteristic
for the ministry than with education for other callings is "not evidence of hostility toward
religion").
291. See id. at 718 (discussing the tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm. of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970))).
292. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982) (voiding a law that exempted
some religious organizations from regulation of charitable solicitations on the ground that the
law was designed to apply only to the Unification Church, and was thus invalid "religious
gerrymandering").
293. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819,
845-46 (1995) (holding that a religious student publication could not be denied funds made
generally available to all other student publications); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-94 (1993) (holding that a public school may not deny a
religious group after-hours access to school facilities where such access is provided to secular
groups).
294. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,652-53 (2002) (5-4 decision) (holding
that the voucher portion of an Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program did not violate the Establishment
Clause even though a large number of participating students enrolled in religiously affiliated
schools).
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of the interplay between religion and government, and this will be due in no
small part to the doctrine that has invited it.
295
F. The Tug of Opposites: Autonomous Self v. Socially-Constructed Self
Neither our culture nor the Court's doctrine is monolithically postmodem,
but the influence of our increasingly postmodern cultural consciousness may be
seen more clearly by noting the tensions that exist when doctrine is influenced
both by conceptions of an autonomous self and a socially-constructed self.
Equal protection rights have long been thought to be "guaranteed to the
individual. The rights established are personal rights., 296 Yet the vindication
of those rights sometimes focuses on groups rather than individuals, as with the
remedial decree in Brown v. Board ofEducation,297 and sometimes the doctrine
itself pays more attention to group than individual attributes.298 The Court's
doctrine with respect to free expression is larded with paeans to individual
expression, 299 but when it comes to expressing oneself politically via the
expenditure of money to advertise a candidate or otherwise assist such electoral
efforts, the Court is far more likely to base its doctrine on societal
considerations. 300 The manner in which the Court mediates these tensions
suggests that it is increasingly willing to see the individual as socially
constructed.
A sampling of recent equal protection cases illustrates the tension. In
United States v. Virginia30 the Court struck down Virginia's maintenance of
295. For an extended treatment of the implications of legislative primacy, see Massey,
supra note 271, at 44-57.
296. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) ("The rights created by the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights
established are personal rights.").
297. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955) (holding that
racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional and directing the lower courts to
"enter such orders and decrees ... as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a
racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases").
298. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,343 (2003) (holding that the University
of Michigan Law School had a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that
flow from a diverse student body).
299. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("[O]ne man's vulgarity is
another man's lyric.").
300. See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 138 (2003) (stating that
although the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, popularly known as McCain-Feingold, is
"complex, [it] does little more than regulate the ability of wealthy individuals, corporations, and
unions, to ... influence federal elections").
301. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,558 (1996) (holding that Virginia failed
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the Virginia Military Institute as a male-only institution in an opinion that
stressed Virginia's constitutional obligation to provide VMI's educational
opportunities to women, no matter how few women might possess the "will and
capacity, 30 2 to undergo VMI's notoriously difficult "rat line. 30 3 By contrast, in
Grutter v. Bollinger"4 the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law
School's admission policy that was focused on assembling a critical mass of
historically disadvantaged racial and ethnic minorities. Although the Court in
Grutter did rely on the Law School's individualized attention to applications, it
was the Law School's objective of achieving a critical mass of racial diversity
in its classrooms that was compelling, and its practice of assembling that
critical mass that was necessary to accomplish that goal.305
Grutter reflects the Court's attempt to mediate the tension between
individual entitlement to equal protection on matters of race and breaking down
socially constructed barriers of racial bigotry. On the one hand, "our
Constitution is color blind. 30 6 On the other hand, the Constitution compels
eradication of racial subordination. Grutter does so by applying strict scrutiny,
a standard premised on the color-blindness principle, but finding that the
objective of racial diversity is compelling and that a fairly Procrustean method
of achieving diversity is necessary to the end.30 7 Grutter has a Janus-like
to show an exceedingly persuasive justification for excluding women from the citizen-soldier
program offered at the Virginia Military Institute in violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
302. See id. at 542 (noting that "[i]t may be assumed.., that most women would not
choose VMI's adversative method").
303. Id.
304. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337-40 (2003) (addressing the University of
Michigan Law School's admissions policy).
305. To be sure, there are limits. In Gratz v. Bollinger, the companion case to Grutter, the
Court balked at approving a more wholesale approach to the goal of increasing racial diversity
in higher education. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275-76 (2003) (holding that the
University of Michigan's freshman admissions policy of automatically distributing 20 points, or
one-fifth of those needed to guarantee admission, to every single "underrepresented minority"
applicant solely because of race violated the Equal Protection Clause).
306. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur
constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.").
307. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 ("[S]tudent body diversity is a compelling state interest
that can justify the use of race in university admissions."); id. at 326 (acknowledging that the
proportion of racial minorities benefited by the admissions objective varied within a narrow
band, although not a "quota"); id. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he Law School's
program is ... a naked attempt to achieve racial balancing."); id. at 386 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Law School has managed its admissions program... to extend offers of
admission to members of selected minority groups in proportion to their statistical
representation in the applicant pool[;] ... precisely the type of racial balancing that the Court
itself calls 'patently unconstitutional.').
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quality with respect to the self: We are autonomous actors; we are socially
constructed. Or, as Justice Ginsburg put it, quoting John Minor Wisdom:
[T]he Constitution is both color blind and color conscious. To avoid
conflict with the equal protection clause, a classification that denies a
benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden must not be based on race. In
that sense, the Constitution is color blind. But the Constitution is color
conscious to prevent discrimination being perpetuated and to undo the
effects of past discrimination. °8
This duality is characteristic of our time: We are simultaneously modem and
postmodem; we live in a cultural cusp in which we hold conflicting world
views. Is it any surprise that our fundamental law should reflect the same
contradictions? Indeed, the embrace of this contradiction is a characteristic
aspect ofpostmodemism. Nor should it surprise us that the Court's handling of
the contradiction is simultaneously modem and postmodem-modemist in its
use of the doctrinal category of strict scrutiny, postmodem in its deference to
the government actors it is supposed to scrutinize strictly.
A tiny sample from free speech-that "Sargasso Sea of drifting and
entangled values, theories, rules, exceptions, [and] predilections,' 309-illustrates
the same tension. An ocean of free expression law emphasizes an individual
right to expression, 310 but here and there emerge islands of doctrine founded on
the socially-constructed self.31  Among the myriad examples of judicial
emphasis of individual expression are such chestnuts as West Virginia State
Board ofEducation v. Barnette312 and Cohen v. California.313 In striking down
308. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966)).
309. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 267, 278 (1991) (discussing the values of the First Amendment and how "first
amendment doctrine is neither clear nor logical").
310. Many commentators ground the free expression guarantee on an assumption of
individual autonomy. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HuMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 59
(1989) (stating that free speech is founded upon "respect for individual integrity and
autonomy").
311. Credit goes to Stephen Macedo for the islands-in-oceans metaphor. See STEPHEN
MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CoNsTITUTIoN 97 (1987) (stating that the Constitution
established islands of governmental power in a sea of individual rights, not islands of rights in a
sea of governmental powers).
312. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (stating that "the
action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose
of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control").
313. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that a conviction resting
solely upon "speech" could be justified under the First and Fourteenth Amendments only based
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a mandatory flag salute, the Barnette Court noted that the free-speech guarantee
"guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, 3 14 and summed up the
notion with its canonical declaration that the "fixed star in our constitutional
constellation" is that no orthodoxy may be prescribed to which citizens may be
forced "to confess by word or act their faith therein. 3 15 Cohen upheld the
individual right to shock or offend onlookers by wearing a jacket that
stridently declared "Fuck the Draft," and grounded its conclusion in part on
the view that "the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style ... largely to
the individual. 3 16 Accordingly, "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric.
'" 317
Although this may be the dominant chord in the free expression score, the
contrapuntal note is sounded by those cases, centered primarily on the subject
of campaign finance, that reject the autonomous individual in favor of a
socially constructed self as the basis for First Amendment analysis. Such cases
as Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce318 and Federal Election
Commission v. National Right to Work Committee319 premised the restrictions
they upheld on corporate political expenditures (Austin) and solicitations by
corporate-controlled political action committees (NR WC) on the view that the
political process was distorted by "immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation with the public's support for the corporation's political ideas.
' 320
This notion has reached its present apogee in McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission,321 in which, among other rulings, the Court upheld a broad ban on
electioneering communications by corporations or unions. Although these
upon the manner in which this freedom was exercised, and not upon the content of the
message).
314. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634.
315. Id. at 642.
316. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
317. Id. The irony embedded in this famous observation is that it simultaneously embraces
the autonomous self of Enlightenment modernity and the value-skepticism of postmodernism.
318. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,668-69 (1990) (holding
that a Michigan statute prohibiting corporations from using corporate treasury funds for
independent expenditures in support of or in opposition to candidates in elections for state
office did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
319. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm'n, 459 U.S. 197, 205-06
(1982) (finding that the NRWC violated federal legislation by soliciting contributions on behalf
of federal candidates from persons who were not its members).
320. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
321. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93,245-46 (2003) (holding that
restrictions on soft money contributions to political campaigns and on issue advertising did not
facially violate the First Amendment and that recordkeeping requirements concerning political
advertising also were valid).
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decisions are ostensibly based on the need to avoid corruption of the democratic
process, they are also implicitly based on a conception of the self that is at odds
with the usual free speech conception of the individual. Most speakers and
listeners are regarded as autonomous actors. As such, they must be free to
speak or to remain silent, and the corollary proposition is that, generally, they
must simply "avert[] their eyes" 322 when confronted with offensive speech. But
collective speech-that which is amplified by the "immense aggregations of
wealth 3 23 of corporations or unions-is the product of a socially constructed
and highly artificial self. Because everyone is constructed by their society, the
"factors contributing to individual socialization must be subject to
governmental control in order for the government adequately to protect every
citizen's full participation in the society's social and political life. 324 And that
is precisely the rationale for upholding the validity of ever stricter limits upon
campaign speech and its "mother's milk"-money.325
At one time the Court could confidently declare that free speech "has its
fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for
political office, 3 2 6 and that "the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment. 3 27 But that time is past; now
the Court thinks that the political process must be protected from the "distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth."3 28 Perhaps the political process is
simply a particularly vivid example of a process of social construction, but if
322. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,21(1971).
323. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
324. Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV.
193, 198 (1996) (asserting the postmodem view).
325. Jesse Unruh, California's Treasurer from 1961 to 1968, famously declared that
"money is the mother's milk ofpolitics." See Coming to Terms: A Money-in-Politics Glossary,
HOOVER INSTITUTION, PUBLIC POLICY INQUIRY, CAMPAIGN FINANCE, CURRENT STRUCTURE,
http://www.campaignfinancesite.org/structure/terms/m.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2006)
(defining "mother's milk") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Nobody has yet
proven Unruh wrong. Indeed, the metaphors proliferate, as EMILY's List suggests: "Early
Money Is Like Yeast." See Who is EMILY?, EMILY'S LIST, http://www.emilyslist.org/
about/who-is-emily.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2006) (stating that EMILY is an acronym for
"Early Money Is Like Yeast") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
326. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (holding that the actual
malice standard for defamation applies to statements concerning candidates for public office).
327. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
328. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990); see also
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 138 (2003) ("Complex as its provisions may
be, [the core of the McCain-Feingold Act] does little more than regulate the ability of wealthy
individuals, corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of money to influence federal
elections, federal candidates, and federal officeholders.").
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postmodern legal theory were to prevail fully in the Court we would see a far
more dramatic restructuring of free speech,329 one in which free speech would
be curtailed more freely. If individuals are socially constructed, their behavior
is the product of their social construction, and that construction is the product
(in part) of the speech that surrounds them. Thus, racist or sexist behavior is
the product of a social construction that is partly created by racist or sexist
speech, or at least speech that accepts and fosters racist or sexist attitudes.
330
Similarly, explicit depictions of violence or sex are said to debase, desensitize,
and construct US. 3 3 1 To address the perceived evil of such socially constructed
identities, it becomes necessary to curb the speech that contributes to the social
construction. After all, free speech is just one of several different, equally
valid, constitutional narratives, and there is no reason to give primacy to any
particular narrative.332 That line of thought has not captured the Supreme
Court, except when it comes to the "mother's milk of politics." But even in
free expression, a bastion of modernity, a postmodern beachhead has been
established. Postmodern theorists think this is an augury of the future;
333
perhaps they are correct.
Further indications of the postmodern beachhead may be seen in the
Court's treatment of sexually explicit speech. Originally, obscenity was
thought to lack any importance because the free expression guarantee "was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people, 334 and the Court thought
329. See generally Gey, supra note 324 (canvassing postmodern theories of free speech
and objecting to the censorship values advocated by postmodern legal theorists).
330. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in
Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 348-58 (1991) (discussing the enactment of antiracism
student conduct rules in response to widespread racial tension on American college campuses);
Richard Delgado, First Amendment Formalism Is Giving Way to First Amendment Legal
Realism, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169, 171-72 (1994) (discussing "the idea that language
and expression can sometimes serve as instruments of positive harm"); Charles R. Lawrence III,
If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431,440-44
(discussing the conduct/speech distinction); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 148 (1987) (explaining that pornography produces
a "social construction of male and female" that causes men to treat women as sexual objects).
331. For an extended discussion of this theme, see PATRICK M. GARRY, REDISCOVERING A
LOST FREEDOM: THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CENSOR UNWANTED SPEECH (2006).
332. See Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules, supra note 330, at 346-47 (discussing how
one can frame free speech problems by "invok[ing] different narratives to rally support").
333. See Delgado, First Amendment Formalism, supra note 330, at 170 (stating that free
speech law is being transformed into "a much more nuanced, skeptical, and realistic view...
that looks to self and class interest, linguistic science, politics, and other tools of the realist
approach to understand how expression functions in our political system").
334. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
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that obscenity was simply not such an idea. The Court's shift of its rationale to
the "'social interest in order and morality ''3 35 as the reason for obscenity's
banishment 336 was the product of greater recognition of the self as socially
constructed. Obscenity implicates the social interest in order and morality only
if it is conceded that obscenity can affect the individual who views it, and that
the cumulation of those effects will produce a rippling of effects upon others.
If individuals were truly autonomous, speech restrictions would be unnecessary,
for autonomous actors may always choose and, thus, non-speech based
restrictions on their behavior should be efficacious.
To similar effect is the Court's schizoid treatment of non-obscene sexually
explicit speech. On one hand, as the secondary effects doctrine attests,
pornography is low value speech that merits lesser protection.337 This is
because of such speech's social impact, though the Court is careful to say that if
the social impact of speech is produced by its communicative impact, the
validity of curbs upon such speech must be subjected to strict scrutiny.338 Even
so, the underlying rationale rests on recognition that speech, whether direct or
335. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61(1973) (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 485
(quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (emphasis deleted))); see
also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (stating that
obscenity may be banned because there is a "right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a
decent society").
336. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,25 (1973) (rejecting "utterly without redeeming
social value" as a constitutional standard). In Miller, the Court redefined obscenity to include
sexually explicit, prurient, and patently offensive materials that, "taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 24 (emphasis added). As Justice
Brennan pointed out in his dissent to the companion case, Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. 49, the
reason obscenity was denied constitutional protection in Roth was because it utterly lacked any
redeeming social value. Id. at 97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A necessary corollary to the Court's
approach to obscenity in Miller was the creation of a new rationale for obscenity's devalued
constitutional status. The majority in Paris Adult Theatre offered several possibilities, some
utilitarian ("the tone of commerce in the great city centers," 413 U.S. at 48); some based on
moral notion ("a legislature could legitimately act ... to protect 'the social interest in order and
morality,"' id. at 61 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572
(emphasis added in Roth)); and some based on a combination of morals and utilitarianism (a
legislature may validly assume "that commerce in obscene books, or public exhibitions [of
obscenity], have a tendency to exert a corrupting and debasing impact leading to antisocial
behavior," Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 63).
337. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)
("[S]ociety's interest in protecting [pornography] is... lesser.., than the interest in
untrammeled political debate.... "); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,
46-48 (1986) (treating as content-neutral zoning restrictions applicable only to purveyors of
pornography because the restrictions were aimed at the non-speech induced secondary effects of
such establishments).
338. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 314 (1988) (stating that the reactions of listeners to
speech are not "secondary effects" of the speech).
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indirect, affects society because it affects behavior and alters our malleable
selves. On the other hand, as in United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group,339 pornography receives unqualified protection and can be the occasion
for a spirited rhetorical defense of free speech doctrine rooted in the
autonomous self. One might think that:
[O]ur free speech jurisprudence... is influenced by the philosophy that
one idea is as good as any other, and that [there are no] objective standards
of style, taste, decorum, beauty, [or] esthetics... [, but the] Constitution
exists precisely so that opinions and judgments, including esthetic and
moral judgments ... can be formed, tested, and expressed. What the
Constitution says is that these judgments are for the individual to make, not
for the Government to decree ....
Doctrine in this area reflects the continuing tension between two conceptions of
individuality. We are autonomous, free to choose our bliss; we are determined
by that which surrounds us, and a welter of sexually explicit pornography
constructs us.
Nor is this tension confined to free speech. The Court in Lawrence may
wax poetic about the dignity due to homosexuals, 34' but it is unwilling to back
that up by any heightened level of review of laws impinging upon that dignity.
By its result and rhetoric Lawrence bows toward the modernist concern for
privileging individual autonomy; by its refusal to apply heightened scrutiny the
Court not only embraces postmodern indeterminacy but curtseys to pre-modem
objections to according equal dignity to the varieties of human sexuality.
Ironically, these pre-modern fears exist because of a dim recognition that
identities are socially constructed. Thus, the Court's implicit deference to these
concerns amounts to an awkward and implicit recognition of the power of
social construction of the individual.
The Court sometimes develops doctrine with a background assumption
that individuals are autonomous, but sometimes it acts upon the assumption that
our identities are socially constructed. There is little indication that it is aware
of its inconsistency or even that it is very aware of the nature of the background
assumption it is making. That said, it is true that the postmodern notion of a
socially constructed self has had a discernible impact on constitutional doctrine,
and that impact is increasing.
339. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
340. Id. at 818.
341. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("[Consenting] adults who... engage[]
in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle... are entitled to respect for their private
lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private
sexual conduct a crime.").
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165 (2007)
IV The Consequences of Postmnodern Constitutional Adjudication
Any discussion of the consequences of postmodem constitutionalism is
necessarily speculative. Accordingly, I shall keep these observations to a
minimum, for I am not a seer. But one does not have to be Nostradamus to
discern at least some likely consequences.
A. "Just the Facts, Ma 'am"
342
Although the early stages of modernity may have been characterized by an
ebullient faith in rational inquiry, the later stages of modernity have been an age
of anxiety. Modem Man is plagued by doubt and fear; the fragmentation and
contingency of experience is cause for alarm. Postmodern Man, however,
celebrates the chaos. Drink in the nonsense, laugh at the bizarre, enjoy the
exhilaration of a Felliniesque existence. Transposed to the prosaic key of
constitutional adjudication, this attitude, whether recognized or not, is apt to
produce fewer grand doctrinal constructs. If the world is incoherent there is no
point in trying to impose an artificial coherence upon it. If everything is
contingent, sweeping pronouncements that cover vast constitutional territory are
as likely to endure as snowflakes in Los Angeles. Constitutional opinions will be
driven by their facts, and the doctrine that is derived from them is apt to be
unstable, shifting, and good for that day only.
To be sure, this is a bit of an overstatement, made in part for dramatic effect.
The Court will continue to fashion doctrine as best it can out of its factually-
driven opinions, and the effort will be sincere. But the doctrinal loom is not likely
to work very well, and the resulting pattern of the cloth that emerges is apt to look
a bit chaotic. Texas's sodomy law is unconstitutional because Texas's desire to
make a moral judgment is illegitimate, but that does not necessarily mean that all
laws founded solely on moral judgments are void. Texas's criminal punishment
of sexual intimacies between same-sex partners demeans their human dignity, but
that does not necessarily mean that laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples
are doomed. The University of Michigan's criteria for admission to its law school
are narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling educational objective because
we assume the law school's good faith in assessing applicants individually, but its
criteria for admission to its undergraduate school are not narrowly tailored
342. This line, credited to Jack Webb's character Sgt. Joe Friday on the 1950s television
show Dragnet, is in fact a corruption of what Webb's character actually said: "All we want are
the facts, ma'am." Snopes.com, Just the Facts, http://www.snopes.com/radiotv/tv/dragnet.htm
(last visited Oct. 17, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But this is the
legendary line, the one that stuck. Id.
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because we do not think the undergraduate admissions officers will apply such
individual attention. But neither of these cases has much to say about similar
criteria applied to public employment, government contracts, or other forms of
governmental benefits.
Constitutional law has used the common law method-the patient accretion
of law case-by-case--but there is a considerable difference between a succession
of narrow holdings, each built upon the last, to produce some semblance of an
orderly edifice, and a jumble of rulings each driven by a felt sense of justice in
response to the facts presented. The former conception of the Court's
methodology is classically modem; the latter conception is distinctly postmodem.
In the modem method, doctrine responds to facts in an attempt to cohere the
whole of the doctrinal field; in the postmodern method, facts become a powerful
solvent of doctrinal coherence. And why not? In the postmodem world
coherence is chimerical. The search for a unified, universal explanation is the
search for a holy grail. Give it up; let's just play with nonsense. So it is that facts
rule. Just the facts, ma'am; the law will take care of itself.
B. Legislators in Robes
Richard Posner has persuasively argued that the "extraordinary growth in the
ratio of lower court to Supreme Court decisions.., has reached a point at which
it is no longer feasible for the Court to control the lower courts by means of
narrow, case-by-case determinations [but] must perforce act legislatively. "
343
Several possible consequences flow from the fact that the flood of cases relative
to the Court's almost finite docket demands that it abandon the common law
method. The practical requirement that the Court must act legislatively could
mean, most obviously, that the justices will be transformed into legislators,
pronouncing policy preferences through the adjudicatory process. But justices
could react to this practical reality by deciding that if the process is
quintessentially legislative the legislature ought to be the one doing the
legislating.344 The latter possibility may be more imaginary than real, because it
is contrary to human nature for those who have clambered into the cockpit of
power to settle in without ever flicking a few switches and levers, much less
taking a test flight or two.
Even so, there may be some exemplars of restraint who can steel
themselves from the temptations of magisterial direction, and it may be that as
343. Posner, supra note 101, at 35 (citations omitted).
344. See id. at 54-57 (discussing the "aggressive judge" approach to constitutional
adjudication, and positing the "modest judge" approach to constitutional adjudication).
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165 (2007)
postmodern epistemological uncertainty becomes ever more pronounced the
Justices will turn that uncertainty into restraint. But because postmodernism
posits that the proper response to epistemological uncertainty is to revel in it,
one might well expect the thoroughly postmodern Justice to embrace
enthusiastically the legislative model of judging. If nobody knows anything,
the postmodern Justice might as well issue his nonsense, for it is surely no
worse or better than the legislature's nonsense.
There are other alternatives to the task ofjudging in a postmodern world.
Judge Posner offers and debunks the Court as expert administrator,
345
34634constrained by its institutional surroundings, moral guru,3  or as
cosmopolitan connoisseur of global norms.348 His objections to these models
differ from mine; I claim that none of these models are tenable in a postmodem
climate. The expert administrator model is doomed in a postmodem world for
it presumes that judges can decide on neutral principles, and the absence of
universal principles (or even neutral ones) is the distinguishing characteristic of
the postmodern age. The institutional setting of the Court-essentially the
demand that its decisions cohere in some sense-is drastically weakened in a
world that increasingly recognizes the absence of coherence. Nor can the Court
be a moral guru in an age in which universal accounts of morality have been
abandoned. Although it might be possible for a postmodern Court to be a
cosmopolitan sampler of global incoherence, there is no coherent way in which
it could pick and choose among those norms. The cosmopolitan Court is
simply a bunch of legislative artists with a broader palette.
Judge Posner ultimately embraces a pragmatic approach 349 -at least he
says it "is correct for me."350 The qualification "correct for me" is itself a
recognition that in this postmodem age there are no universal narratives of
judging. Whatever works for each person is the apparent standard, a point of
view encapsulated in at least one of the meanings of the ubiquitous
contemporary expression, "whatever." To the extent that pragmatic
considerations are urged to dominate judging in the postmodem age, we are
entitled to wonder how such practical consequences are to be measured.
Practicality requires some metric of the desirable, and if there is no universal, or
even dominant, account of the "good," one wonders how successful will be the
345. Id. at 60-75.
346. Id. at 75-81.
347. Id. at 81-84.
348. Posner, supra note 101, at 84-90.
349. See id. at 90-102 (arguing that judges should "focus on the practical consequences of
their decisions").
350. Id. at 90.
THE CONSTITUTION IN A POSTMODERN A GE
venture into pragmatic adjudication. One man's practicality is another man's
folly. Whatever.
We are left with the strong likelihood that postmodern constitutional
adjudication will be legislation, but legislation with some differences from the
usual sort. Legislatures may work with facts, but they are free to choose the
facts with which they deal or invent them if they so please. Legislatures are
free to do what they will with facts; most remedies are open to them.
Legislating is a relatively unconstrained medium. Judges, however, even in a
postmodern world, are not as free. Facts come to them in the gelatinous aspic
of a cold record, and they must respond to them. In the modem world, judges
responded to facts through the filter of doctrine, and the challenge was to refine
doctrine into an ever more coherent whole. But the postmodern tendency is to
respond to those facts without much concern for the coherence of doctrine. If
anything, doctrine is somewhat bothersome, a fustian relic of a modem past.
Thus, as with the legislature's brand of legislation, judicial legislation in the
postmodern world is far more apt to change with each session.
C. All Politics, All the Time
An almost inevitable byproduct of the changes wrought in adjudication by
the postmodern age is the increased politicization of the Court and selection of
its Justices. Although the commonplace observation is to attribute this
phenomena to the issue of abortion, it is more accurate to attribute it to a much
broader range of concerns, all of which cluster around recognition of the Court
as a political actor. In one sense, this is nothing new; in 1954 Justice Robert
Jackson prepared his never-delivered Godkin Lectures on the triple themes of
the Supreme Court as a unit of government, law court, and political
institution.351 What is new is the emphasis on the last of Justice Jackson's
themes. The nation has come to perceive that the Court's work is not so much
lawyer's work-a term that implies some uniquely professional competence
that sets it apart from the ordinary hurly-burly of politics-but unvarnished
political judgment. Given what has been discussed before, this should hardly
be a surprise. The postmodern age has pushed the Court (or it has jumped) into
the dusty arena of politics. Postmodemism has brought the Justices from the
351. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT 1,28, 53 (1955) (describing the Supreme Court as an equal yet dependant entity
of the federal government charged not only with administering civil and criminal matters, but
also with arbitrating the allocation of power between the two political branches, the states, and
the citizens).
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courthouse to the OK Corral; Wyatt Earp and his brothers may have been
wearing the sheriffs star, but they were blazing away with the best of
gunslingers. Because judicial decisions are "political judgment[s], and a
political judgment cannot be called right or wrong by reference to legal norms,"
it is no longer possible to speak of a Court decision as "'correct' or
'incorrect,' ... all one can actually mean is that one likes.., or dislikes...
it.1352 So it is that John Roberts and Samuel Alito were asked questions to
probe their political views, not to gauge their legal acumen. Political
conservatives were not so much aghast at Harriet Miers's legal credentials as
they were terrified at the prospect that she might not be reliable in her political
judgments. Justice O'Connor suddenly became the darling of Senate liberals
because her political judgments on abortion and racially based preferences were
congenial to their own political views, not because she is the legal sage of her
era.
The trend will only become more distinct in the postmodem age. Indeed,
although the Court's docket includes enough non-constitutional cases to merit
the nomination of lawyers who will comprehend the issues, at least with respect
to constitutional cases, there is no compelling reason why the Justices ought
exclusively to be lawyers. However, as with architecture, form does not always
follow function, or at least the progression is not immediate. But the function
has changed; it is all politics now, all the time.
V Conclusion
We live in a postmodem age. The effects of our postmodem culture upon
constitutional law have only dimly been appreciated. Just as postmodern
thought posits the absence of universal narratives and the embrace of
indeterminacy, so has American constitutional law begun to lose its
commitment to the goal of doctrinal coherence. If all is indeterminate, there is
no good reason why doctrine must cohere into a universally applicable, fully
determined methodology that will answer all our questions. This phenomenon
may be particularly observed in equal protection, substantive due process, the
religion clauses, and free expression, but is likely present across the entire
spectrum of constitutional law. The effects of this phenomenon, or at least
those that are presently observable, are an increased tendency to craft decisions
around facts without much regard to constitutional doctrine; a shift from the
common law method of adjudication-the accretion of doctrine case-by-case in
352. Posner, supra note 101, at 40.
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a long running attempt to weave a fine web of coherent principles-to a
legislative model in which decisions are made but are not intended to be
derived from exogenous principles; and a public recognition that constitutional
adjudication is simply political judgment. These effects, which are likely to
become more pronounced as our culture becomes ever more postmodern, will
accentuate the Court's role as a political institution and will likely increase
proposals to make the Court more politically accountable.

